

**PAN AFRICAN INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT – WEST AFRICA
P.O. BOX 133, BUEA, CAMEROON**



DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF TERRORISM IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN: THE CASE OF BOKO HARAM

A Thesis Submitted to the Department of Development Studies, in Partial
Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of a Master of Science (M.Sc)
degree in Peace, Conflicts and International Relations

By

FORMBUI ZINA ANTIMBOM
PAIDWA00039

Supervisor
Uwem Essia (PhD)
Christian Fonye

BUEA, JUNE 2016

*The author reserves total responsibility for meeting the requirements set by Copyright Laws for the inclusion
of any materials that are not the author's creation or in the public domain.*

THESIS FINAL SUBMISSION FORM

This is to confirm that I have formally submitted my thesis titled "*Transnationalization of Terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin: The Case of Boko Haram Insurgency*" to the Pan African Institute for Development – West Africa (PAID-WA) as an original research report for the award of the *Master of Science (M.Sc) degree in Peace, Conflict and International Relations* this 07/07/2016.

To the best of my knowledge, this thesis has neither infringed upon anyone's copyright nor violated any proprietary rights. The ideas, techniques, quotations, and other materials obtained from other scholarly works included in my thesis, published or otherwise, are fully acknowledged. I declare also that this thesis has not been submitted for a degree to any other University or Institution of Higher Learning.

I agree that information and findings contained in this thesis – in the form of statements, graphics, equations or otherwise – shall remain the property of PAID-WA. PAID-WA further retains the exclusive right to publish or disseminate it in all languages, and publications arising from this thesis.

The author assumes total responsibility for meeting the requirements set by Copyright Laws for the inclusion of any materials that are not the author's creation or in the public domain.

Name of Student Submitting Thesis:	Formbui Zina Antimbom
Matriculation Number of Student:	PAIDWA00039
Title of the Thesis:	Transnationalization of Terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin: The Case of Boko Haram Insurgency
Degree/Diploma/Certificate in View:	Master of Science (M.Sc)

Date of Submission:

14th July, 2016

Signature of Student Submitting Thesis:



DEDICATION

To my parents Mr Formbui Emmanuel and Mrs Dolores Bih and my uncle Mr Formbui Paul.

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this thesis titled, **“Transnationalization of Terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin: The Case of Boko Haram Insurgency”** by Formbui Zina Antimbom (Reg No. PAID-WA00039) at the Pan African Institute for Development-West Africa (PAID-WA), Buea is the record of research carried under due supervision. The information and data used from the work of contributory authors in the field of study have been duly acknowledged.

Sign:
Dr. Uwem Essia
Supervisor



Date: 13-07-16

Sign:
Mr. Christian Fonye
Co-Supervisor

Date: 7TH JULY 2016

DECLARATION

I, Formbui Zina Antimbom (Reg No. PAID-WA00039) hereby declare that I am the author of this thesis titled “**Transnationalization of Terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin: The Case of Boko Haram Insurgency**” done under the guidance of my supervisor and that no part of this thesis has been published or submitted for publication.

I declare that, to the best of my knowledge this thesis is entirely my work and does not violate or infringe any propriety rights. Materials derived or obtained from the work of other people included in this thesis has been fully acknowledged.

I declare that this thesis has not been submitted for a degree to any other University or Higher Institution elsewhere.

Sign: 

Date: 7th July 2016

Formbui Zina Antimbom
Student

The above declaration is confirmed by:

Sig: 

Dr. Uwem Essia
Supervisor



Date: 13-07-16

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank my supervisors, Dr. Uwem Essia and Mr. Christain Fonye for their meticulous and critical insight and inspiration and continuous support to enable me complete this thesis. I also wish to thank the staff of the Postgraduate programme including Dr Dan Ekongwe, Dr Nkongho, Mr. Ekema Richard Agbor, Dr. Ngomba, Mme Christy Monjowa and especially Dr. Valentine Ndefru (of blessed memory) for their contribution towards my training.

Furthermore, I appreciate the effort of my respondents who worked with me providing the necessary information needed for the realization of this thesis. In addition, I thank the University of Buea and PAID-WA Library authorities for permitting me to use their libraries to carry out the research for this work.

I immensely thank my parents, Mr. Formbui Emmanuel and Mrs. Dolores Bih for their continued support, motivation and criticisms to enable me improve on this thesis. I am thankful to my brothers, Formbui Nelson, Ngoh Prudence, Ngoh Barry, Formbui Haddison and Kema Felan and my sisters, Formbui Edna, Formbui Emmanuella and Kema Christie for their enormous contribution. I am also grateful to my uncles, Mr. Formbui Paul Mr. Kema John and my aunt Mrs. Kema Jenny and others whose names are not mentioned for their continued support in times of need.

I sincerely appreciate Mr. Forzi Francis and Mrs. Clementine Dayo for their encouragement, advice and support during my stay in Buea as well as my friends Hyginus Ngam, Martin Tasah, Zillah Nges and course mates Annette Epeti, Beryl Ndula, Mr. Lawrence Iyok, Lydia Tamungang, Macmillan Fondu, Patience Fondason and Mr. Thomas Tambe with whom I discussed this work

ABSTRACT

The emergence of Boko Haram, as an Islamic extremist terrorist group that has been agitating for the introduction of strict Islamic laws and the Islamisation of Nigeria through violent activities such as killing, bombing, and suicide bombing has taken a transnational dimension Ayeotan (2012). It has more recently transformed into one of the fiercest terrorist organizations, whose violent activities have seriously affected the lives of people across Nigeria and its neighbouring countries. Also, the group has been described as a domestic terrorist group because of the initial scope of its atrocities mainly in Nigeria. This work sought to investigate the factors that led to the transnationalization of terrorism in the Lake Chad basin with case study of the Boko Haram insurgency. Structured interviews were used to collect primary data for the study. The respondents were principally military and security personnel, civilians, and elites. Due to the broad nature of the scope and the high level of insecurity in the study area, the study made more use of secondary than primary data. The study employed material collected from news channels, websites, published and unpublished thesis, books and articles. The results indicated that ignorance and deprivation and socio – cultural relations were the leading factors that have sustained and deepened the Boko Haram crisis. Accordingly, it is recommended that the governments of Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, and Niger should set up social centres in the affected areas that would promote socio-cultural interaction of the local people with people from other areas of the country.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION	i
CERTIFICATION	Error! Bookmark not defined.
DECLARATION	Error! Bookmark not defined.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
ABSTRACT.....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
LIST OF TABLES	ix
LIST OF FIGURES	x
APPENDIX.....	xi
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	xii

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study	1
1.2.1 ISIS	3
1.1.2 Al-Shabaab.....	3
1.1.3 Al-Qaeda	4
1.1.4 Boko Haram	4
1.2. Statement of the Problem	5
1.3 Objectives of the study.....	7
1.4 Research questions	7
1.5 Significance of the Study	8
1.6 Scope of the study	8
1.7 Organization of the study	10
1.8 Definition of Key Concepts	11
1.8.1 Transnationalism.....	11

1.8.2 Terrorism.....	11
1.8.3 Fundamentalism	11
1.8.4 Enigma	12
1.8.5 Conflict	12

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Literature Review.....	13
2.1.1 Transnational Terrorist Groups	13
2.1.2 The Emergence and Evolution of Boko Haram	14
2.1.3 Philosophical Trajectories (Timeline) of Boko Haram	16
2.1.4 The Socio-Cultural Drivers of Boko Haram’s Transnationalization	19
2.1.5 The Cross-Border Cooperation and Lake Chad Area Countries and Counter Terrorism	23
2.1.5.1 The Shortcomings of the Cross-Border Cooperation and Lake Chad Area Countries and Counter Terrorism.....	28
2.1.6 The Geographical Enablers of Boko Haram’s Transnationalization	31
2.1.7 Human Capital Deficits and Transnationalization of Boko Haram	33
2.2 Theoretical Framework.....	35
2.2.1 The Social Conflict Theory.....	35
2.2.2 Frustration-Aggression Theory	40
2.2.3 Relative Deprivation Theory.....	41
2.2.4 Collective Security Approach	41
2.3 Gaps Identified in the Literature Review	42

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design.....	44
3.1.1 Study Approach	44
3.1.2 Study Period and Target Population	44
3.1.3 Sampling Strategy	44

3.2 Data Collection	45
3.3 Analytical Approach	45
3.4 Validation of Results.....	45

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

4.1 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents	47
4.2 Presentation of Findings.....	51
4.2.1 What socio-cultural factors support the transnationalization of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin area?	51
4.2.2 How has the level of cooperation of the Lake Chad Basin countries affected the success of counter-terrorism effort in the area?	52
4.2.3. How have the vast ungoverned areas linking the Lake Chad area to the Sahel region contributed to the growth of Boko Haram?.....	54
4.2.4 How has the level of human capital development of people in the area affected the counter-terrorism war?	56
4.3 Discussion of Findings.....	59
4.3.1 The socio-cultural factors that lead to the spread of Boko Haram.....	59
4.3.2 Cooperation with the Lake Chad area countries in fighting the sect	60
4.3.3 The vast unsecured and ungoverned borders and its impacts on Boko Haram activities	61
4.3.4 The human capital deficits and the transnationalization of Boko Haram	61
4.4 Limitations of the study	63
5.5 Limitations of the study	63

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of findings.....	65
5.2 Conclusion	66
5.3 Recommendations.....	67
5.4 Suggested areas for further research	68

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Surface Area of the Basin among the LCBC Member Nations.....	9
Table 2: Distribution of respondents to sex.....	47
Table 3: Distribution of respondents with respect to age group.....	48
Table 4: Distribution of respondents with respect to marital status.....	48
Table 5: Distribution of respondents with respect to level of education.....	49
Table 6: Distribution of respondents to longevity of service.....	50
Table 7: Distribution of respondents' to cooperation type and the extent of cooperation.....	52

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: The Lake Chad Basin.....	9
Figure 2: Political Map of Nigeria.....	10
Figure 3: Distribution of respondents with respect to occupation.....	50
Figure 4: Distribution of cultural aspects that influence the spread of the Boko Haram.....	51
Figure 5: Distribution of respondent's opinions to activities in the Chad pipeline border.....	55
Figure 6: Distribution of respondents to human capital factors that affects the spread of Boko Haram.....	57

APPENDIX

Interview Guide.....	77
----------------------	----

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AFRICOM	Africa Command
AU	African Union
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of West African States
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IR	International Relations
MUJAO	Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
NCFR	National Commission for Refugees
NCS	Nigerian Customs Service
NPC	National Population Commission of Nigeria
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PDP	People's Democratic Party
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SSS	State Security Services
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The emergence of Boko Haram, as an Islamic extremist terrorist group that has been agitating for the introduction of strict Islamic laws and the Islamisation of Nigeria through violent activities such as killing, bombing, and suicide bombing has taken a transnational dimension (Ayeotan 2012). It has more recently transformed into one of the fiercest terrorist organizations, whose violent activities have seriously affected the lives of people across Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. Transnational terrorism is diverse and multifaceted regarding scope and intensity. Dealing with it requires investment in international security and diplomacy. It also entails cooperation between domestic, regional and international actors in the areas of peace, security and development. The study examines the transnational characteristics of Boko Haram, its enigmatic character and why it has become difficult to clamp down the terrorist group.

Boko Haram attacks took a cross-border dimension when on July 27, 2014; over 200 militants stormed Kolofata, a town in the Extreme North region of Cameroon targeting the residence of the Vice Prime Minister, Amadou Ali. During that attack, the wife, and sister in law of the Vice Prime Minister, as well as the Mayor and Seini Lamine, a senior religious leader, were kidnapped to an unknown destination. The night before, Boko Haram had carried out an attack on the Cameroon military in Extreme North region which resulted in the death of four Cameroonian soldiers and the kidnapping of thirteen (13) others. The abduction of the Cameroonian soldiers marked the Spread of Boko Haram attacks into Cameroon. Additionally, two sons of Bieshair Mohaman, a Cameroonian traditional leader in Limani were also kidnapped on July 15, 2014. In Northern Nigeria, authorities traced some of the explosives used in the attacks to a quarry in Northern Cameroon that was raided by Boko Haram in May 2014.

Much earlier in December 2013, Nigerien authorities foiled a plot to kidnap the central government representative, the local governor, and the military zone commander in Diffa. More recently, Boko Haram members in Diffa ambushed an army patrol and escaped to the Nigerian side of the border. Following this event, three Boko Haram members were captured and the next day, nine more were arrested in connection to the attack.

In Chad, border security was expanded on August 6, 2014, when Boko Haram militants crossed into the country and gunned down six Nigerians in Dubuwa village. The Nigerians had fled an earlier attack on Kirenowa, a Nigerian town close to the Cameroonian border. In a more brazen attempt to enter Chadian territory, on August 16, 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 97 people including boys and several women from the Doron Baga fishing village in Nigeria near Lake Chad.

Walker (2012) notes that the transnational characteristics of Boko Haram operations are facilitated by some factors, including the following:

- 1) Firstly, the borders of the affected countries are long and porous, with little security, immigration or control checkpoints. The vast “ungoverned spaces” allow Boko Haram and other criminal gang’s easy passage into the various countries and ready space to create safe heavens where attacks and training of new members are carried out. Nigeria shares a soft border of 2,000 miles with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon and has almost 1,500 illegal or unmonitored crossing routes.
- 2) Secondly, the concerned countries lack the required expertise to combat terrorism and insurgency, particularly because the warfare is non-conventional. Except the Chadian military that has engaged terrorist groups from Mali and North Africa, the army of the other countries are poorly trained for the asymmetric warfare waged by Boko Haram.
- 3) Thirdly, the slow and weak response of Nigeria to initial attacks by Boko Haram and the absence of an early regional counter-terrorism initiative allowed the terrorist crises of the region to grow out of proportion. Even after a Multilateral cooperation effort was launched in Paris in May 2014 at the Paris Summit for Security where Nigeria and its neighbors agreed to cooperate on security issues, all the parties involved have failed to set clear guidelines for multilateral cooperation to address cross-border vulnerabilities.
- 4) Fourthly, the areas targeted by Boko Haram in the different countries share ethnic/cultural, religious and linguistic links. The affinities (particularly the Kanuri, Hausa, and Shuwa Arab ties) transcend national boundaries facilitating cross-border movement and making policing in the area tough. It’s hard to determine the actual nationalities of people in the area, and Boko Haram takes advantage of the situation to mix terrorism with the informal cross-border commerce.

5) Fifthly, Coker (2002) notes that globalization has changed the scope, intensity and nature of terrorism in the post-Cold War era. He opines that since 1990, terrorist groups have grown in number, sophistry, scope, ruthlessness, and geographical spread of operation. More so, contemporary terrorism has deviated from the traditional choice of targeting military establishments and governments to targeting vulnerable civilian population.

Furthermore, it is increasingly argued that globalization encourages religious fundamentalism, wars of identity and the fragmentation of states. Cooker and David (2012) observe that forty (40) years ago, there existed no religious terrorist movement worldwide. In the 1980's only two (2) of sixty-four (64) known terrorist organizations in the world were animated by religious fundamentalism. By the 1990s, Al Qaeda led by Osama Bin Laden became the leading global terror group. Terrorism became a global security challenge. To understand the character and transformation of terrorism into a transnational threat or cross-border conflict of large security concern, and particularly the transnational nature of Boko Haram's activities, it is important to look at other transnational terrorist groups and their activities.

1.2.1 ISIS

According to Boas (2012), ISIS means Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The ideological goal of ISIS is to cement its name: "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria" and objective in peoples' minds and create a large-scale theocracy made up of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan. Boas also opines that ISIS has taken advantage of the conflict in Iraq where the political vacuum after the demise of the former president Saddam Hussein has led to a power struggle and military conflict between the Sunni minority and the Shiite majority.

1.1.2 Al-Shabaab

The name Al-Shabaab means "the youth." The group is battling for a theocracy in the Horn of Africa, but radical Islamist ideology recognizes no national frontiers. They have carried out attacks beyond East Africa - as well as in the Kenyan capital Nairobi, where more than 60 people were murdered in an armed attack on a shopping center in September 2013. Al-Shabaab dominates large parts of central and southern Somalia and maintains close links with Al-Qaeda, ISIS and Boko Haram (Daily Trust April 19, 2012).

1.1.3 Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda is regarded as the parent organization of global jihad. Its name means "base" or "foundation." Al-Qaeda was the brain behind the attacks on New York on September 11, 2001. Their aim is to establish a theocracy which includes all Islamic countries and territories. Today, Al-Qaeda is a loose network of largely independent cells that are active in many countries. Amidst them is Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which operates mainly in Algeria and northern Mali, and Al-Qaeda in Yemen, a jihadist stronghold (Falola, 2012).

1.1.4 Boko Haram

Boko Haram is currently the fastest growing terrorist group that is quite active in the North Eastern part of Nigeria. Boko Haram is committed to the introduction of Sharia law across the country. The group attracted a significant amount of media attention when the Chibok girls were kidnapped in April 2014. Since 2003, thousands of people have been killed in attacks on security forces, government agencies, churches and schools (Campbell, 2014).

Poverty and deprivation are other key strengthening features of Boko Haram, and dealing effectively with it requires an empowerment strategy that focuses on illiteracy and poverty eradication. The Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (2012) notes that 70 percent of the population in North-East Nigeria (Boko Haram's traditional stronghold), live on less than a dollar a day, compared to 50 percent in the South-West and 59 percent in the South-East. Similarly, female literacy rates range from 23 percent in the North-East to more than 79 percent in the South (National Population Commission and ICP Marco, 2009). By this measure, the socioeconomic inequalities thus add to the already charged ethnic, religious and regional tensions. As Bøås (2012) aptly puts it, the disparity between the north and the south of Nigeria has alienated many inhabitants of the north and render them more vulnerable to supporting and joining Boko Haram.

In their study titled 'Terrorism in West Africa: Boko Haram's Evolution, Strategy and Affiliations,' Minteh and Perry (2013) have identified diverse sources of funding to terrorist groups and organization that include black market sales of crude from oil fields as well as systematic extortion that involves kidnapping for ransom. It is estimated that the group has about 10,000 fighters in its ranks drawn from across the world where euphoria of jihadist tendencies and international warrior culture has gripped Muslim youths of both sexes.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

The violent tactics employed by Boko Haram and selection of targets to strike have attracted international attention due to its growing lethality, a scale of violence and its transnational ramifications. Its activities and the effects of its operations go beyond the traditional combat zone which is Nigeria (Walker, 2012). In its resolve to assert its ideology and territorial ambitions, Boko Haram exploits the ungoverned spaces along the borders of neighboring countries like Chad, Niger, Benin, and Cameroon. There are more than 1000 border entry routes from these four countries which are unmanned and uncontrolled (Udeh, 2011). The porous nature of these boundaries heightens the potential for transnational transactions such as the recycling of small arms and light weapons, mercenaries, training and funding, acquisition of strategic resources and recruitment of militarized refugees and foreign fighters. The Boko Haram sect has launched attacks on Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. Cameroon has been hitherto identified as the critical zone for cross-border attacks which intensified at a time of increasing counter-activities in May 2014 between Nigerian forces and suspected Boko Haram insurgents, with at least a dozen Boko Haram militants arrested. On May 5th, 2014, three members of Boko Haram were arrested in Niger after they attacked an army patrol in the eastern region of Diffa. The cross-border atrocities of Boko Haram and the following slow multilateral or regional response to the threat have propelled the insurgency into a transnational scale.

The cross-border dimension and manifestation of Boko Haram pose a severe security challenge for Nigeria's neighbors and the region at large. In February 2013, the sect conducted its first attack outside Nigeria when it kidnapped a French family in Northern Cameroon near the border with Nigeria (Bey and Tack, 2013). According to the UNHCR report of (2012), over 600,000 Nigerians have sought refuge in neighboring countries since May 2013. There are about 40,000 Nigerian refugees in the Niger Republic with about 28,000 in Cameroon with the majority coming from bordering communities. Many of these refugees fled without any food or water intensifying the strain on scarce resources and social services of the host communities.

Furthermore, the negative economic situation has added to the diplomatic unease in Cameroon-Nigeria relations. Nigerian authorities have criticized Cameroon for not doing enough to secure its borders, noting that Boko Haram has been using Cameroonian territory as a transit route for weapons and as a base to launch attacks in North Eastern Nigeria (Checkel, 2010).

Moreover, cross-border abductions by Boko Haram have scared off potential tourists in the Far North Region of Cameroon, leading to a sharp drop in customs revenue in Cameroon. The violence has severely affected the economies of the region and the general wellbeing of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin amongst other countries which are linked to the Nigerian economy (Collier, 2007).

Transnational terrorism poses a major problem because it expands the reach of violent extremism and complicates the efforts of an effective response, in a region where regional cooperation is limited by mistrust, limited strategic capacity, and governance related challenges. The delay in creating a Multinational Joint Task Force and some restrictions by the Nigerian government to neighboring countries like Cameroon, limiting its response only to particular areas of the border constitutes a big challenge for an effective response to the threat and its potential for territorial expansion. It took the intervention of France during the Paris summit, to bring all the neighboring West African countries together to understand that Boko Haram could not be adequately dealt with through single country solutions. The French government called the leaders of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroun together in Paris on May 17, 2014, urging the need for strengthened cooperation between member states of the Lack Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the Benin Republic.

Boko Haram aims at establishing an Islamic caliphate in Nigeria, which may extend to ungoverned spaces around border countries where this sect has gained some grounds in positioning itself. Boko Haram had gained control of 14 of the 776 local government areas in Northern Nigeria (Walker, 2012). Already, a Multilateral Force involving soldiers from the affected countries has been constituted, and the United States has sent 300 huge contingents along with surveillance drones, to Cameroon to boost up the counter-terrorism effort of the Multilateral Force (Aljazeera, 14 Oct 2015 22:44). The UN is also making efforts to support the regional cooperation of members of the Lake Chad Basin region and Benin.

So far, much success has been registered; the Nigerian military operations have led to the liberation of many communities that were held hostage by the Boko Haram insurgents. The newly elected Nigerian government under the leadership of President Buhari has demonstrated more resolve in employing a regional approach in arresting the threat. The recently deployed US troops to Cameroon has maintained relative peace since their arrival and will together with the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) liberate the Lake Chad Basin region from the grip of

Boko Haram. Despite these significant successes achieved, much still needs to be done as Boko Haram still holds territories and if not deterred, its activities may spread to nearby fragile states like Democratic Republic of Congo, Benin, and the Central African Republic.

Cross-border attacks and different external factors that feed and sustain the Boko Haram sect reveal how an initially Nigerian based insurgency is becoming a source of insecurity in neighboring countries. It is in this regard that research on the trans nationalization of Boko Haram is germane. The need to contain the transnational reach of Boko Haram is, therefore, real and warrants a comprehensive regional and international response. This is more so because Boko Haram is waging an asymmetric war with serious adverse security implications in a region which reveals symptoms of inefficient border management strategies and effective democratic governance.

1.3 Objectives of the study

The principal purpose of this study is to examine the factors that have led to the transnationalization of terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin region, especially with the Boko Haram insurgency. The specific objectives are:

1. To analyze the extent to which socio - cultural factors of the peoples of the Lake Chad Basin region promote the spread of Boko Haram in the area.
2. To examine the level of cooperation among the affected countries and its impact on the counter-terrorism effort.
3. To review how the vast ungoverned areas linking the Lake Chad area to the Sahel region has contributed to the growth of Boko Haram.
4. To evaluate how the high level of illiteracy and poverty of people in the area have supported local acceptability and the recruitment strategy of Boko Haram.

1.4 Research questions

1. To What extent is the transnationalization of Boko Haram influenced by socio-cultural factors in the Lake Chad Basin?
2. How has the level of cooperation of the Lake Chad Basin countries affected the success of counter-terrorism effort in the area?

3. How has ease of accessibility to the Lake Chad area from the Sahel and North African area affected the counter - insurgency efforts of the concerned countries?
4. To what extent has illiteracy and poverty facilitated local acceptability and the recruitment strategy of Boko Haram?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The significance may be assessed on three levels; policy reinforcement, academic scholarship and local level action.

At the degree of policy, this study provides a compelling and useful basis upon which transnational terrorism may be curbed and arrested based on effective regional and international cooperation. As terrorist groups reassert huge territorial ambitions around the world, the responses and measures taken by states need a coordinated and comprehensive approach to reverse the insecurity and havoc generated by these non-state actors. Way beyond military strategies, states also need integrated development plan like effective border management strategies. From an assessment of the causes of transnationalization, preventive measures could be taken in other countries facing a similar challenge or menace.

The study also serves as a call to action for the local border populations or communities which are most often exploited as the strategic determinant in spreading terror across national boundaries. The need for a conscious border management policy in border communities plagued by terrorist incursions also underscores the relevance of this study.

1.6 Scope of the study

The scope of the study is shown on a map to indicate the geo-historical dimension and transnational dimension of the conflict. The geographical scope of the study comprises of the part of Northeastern Nigeria, Extreme North Region of Cameroon, North East Niger and North West Chad found in the Lake Chad Basin region. In other words, the conflict covers two geo-political Zones in Sub - Saharan Africa, that is, Central African sub region to which Cameroon and Chad belong and West Africa to which Nigeria and Niger is a part. This means that the fight against Boko Haram must be looked at from a multilateral perspective regarding building an international coalition. To this end, the scope of multilateralism involved the defunct CEMAC now ECCAS and ECOWAS for what concerns Nigeria and its Western neighbors.



Figure 1: The Lake Chad Basin

Source: IUCN-ROCA 2012

The Lake Chad basin covers a surface area of 2, 300,000 km². The Lake Chad is fed by the Chari and Logone rivers. The Lake Chad is shared by Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon. It is located between 12° and 14° 20 N, 13° and 15° 20 E. The sailing area is situated at the altitude of 283 m. It has an ethnically diverse population of about 30 million people as of 2011, growing rapidly. The area mapped out and demarcated by the red boundary line is the area under dispute.

Table 1: Surface Area of the Basin among the LCBC Member Nations

State	Size of Basin (km ²)	% of National Territory
Cameroon	56,800	12.12
Niger	162,375	12.70
Nigeria	188,000	22.17
Chad	361,980	28.42
CAR	197,800	31.75
Total	967,000	-

Source: IUCN-ROCA

A structure for economic cooperation and integration built round the shared resources of Lake Chad has been well perceived even if not achieved. This was demonstrated by the political

leaders of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, who, through a Convention and Statute signed at Fort Lamy (N'djamena) on May 22, 1964. This convention brought about the establishment of an intergovernmental organization - Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) for the development of the Lake Chad Basin. Due to the drying up of the basin, the area seems to have been abandoned giving room for Boko Haram to infiltrate and use the poverty state of the inhabitants as an opportunity to cause atrocities.



Figure 2: Political Map of Nigeria

Source: University of Texas Library 2012

1.7 Organization of the study

The work is divided into five chapters. Chapter one which is the Introduction constitutes the background to the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study and research questions, a significance of the study and scope of the study. Chapter Two focuses on Literature

Review; looking at the objectives of the study which were to examine the socio – cultural factors, level of cooperation, ungoverned borders and the degree of illiteracy and poverty which have led to the spread of insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin Region, and Theoretical Framework focusing on the social conflict theory and the frustration – aggression theory of terrorism. Chapter Three presents the methodology of the study. Chapter Four presents and analyses information collected for the study. Lastly, Chapter Five presents the summary of the Findings, Conclusion, and Recommendation.

1.8 Definition of Key Concepts

1.8.1 Transnationalism

Transnationalization means extending or going beyond national boundaries or interest. Transnational terrorism is a “premeditated threatened or actual use of force or violence to attain a political goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” and when its ramifications transcend national boundaries by means of the nationality of the perpetrators which can be human or institutional victims, as well as the location of the incident or event and the mechanics of its resolution (Mickolus et al., 1989).

1.8.2 Terrorism

Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or sub-national groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims (Enders & Sandler, 2012). Violence is a symbol of terrorism, with some terrorist groups engaging in gruesome attacks to create widespread anxiety or revulsion. To qualify as terrorism, an attack must have a political motive. By limiting terrorism to sub-national agents, the above definition rules out state terror, where a government terrorizes its people. However, the definition does not exclude state-sponsored terrorism, in which a government secretly aids a terrorist group through funds, intelligence, safe passage, or some other means. Finally, the definition emphasizes that the actual target of the anxiety-generating attacks is a wider public, who may pressure the government to concede to the demands of the terrorists (Rand, 2012). Terrorists employ various modes of attacks such as assassinations, kidnappings, skyjackings, threats, and bombings to intimidate the targeted audience

1.8.3 Fundamentalism

The term Fundamentalism usually has a religious connotation that indicates unwavering attachment to a set of beliefs or ideas. The term first appeared in United States Protestant circles

in line with the movement that developed before World War I and whose followers occasionally referred to themselves as “fundamentalists”. This explains why the term is most often referred to as a movement in American Protestantism that arose in the early part of the 20th century in reaction to modernism. However, the word fundamental as used in this study describes any religious impulse that adheres to its basic tenets. As a result, Islamic fundamentalism is adhering to the ideas and belief systems of the Muslim faith described as the Sunni law. This law is against western civilization, and this explains the ideology of Boko Haram (Minteh, 2013).

1.8.4 Enigma

An enigma is something that baffles understanding and lacks a coherent explanation. In the context of this study, Boko Haram is considered a mystery because it is difficult to define its objectives, political or religious dimension and beliefs. It is uncertain whether the group is Islamic because their victims have included their Muslim brothers and they have attacked and destroyed Mosques. Also, it is controversial to site the development of their communities as an objective after the group deviated from its original humanitarian focus as will be examined in the next chapter.

1.8.5 Conflict

Conflict can be considered as some form of friction, disagreement, or discord arising within a group when the beliefs or actions of one of more members of the group are either resisted by or unacceptable to one or more members of another group. M.Nicholson (1992) argues that a conflict exists when two people wish to execute acts which are mutually inconsistent. Both of them may want to do the same thing, such as using the same car, or they may want to do different things where the different things are mutually incompatible. A conflict is resolved when some mutually compatible resolutions are adopted. The definition of conflict can be extended from individuals to groups (such as states or nations), and more than two parties can be involved in the conflict. The principles remain the same.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter has two major sub-sections, firstly literature review and secondly conceptual framework. The literature review concerns issues raised by the research questions such as socio-cultural drivers of Boko Harams' transnationalization, cross-border cooperation, and counter-terrorism, the vast ungoverned areas linking the Lake Chad region to North Africa, and little human capital development of populations in the Lake Chad basin area. The theoretical framework focuses on socio-political theories linking struggles for resources, migration, and conflicts. However, before Nigeria was established, Fulani jihads from 1804 to 1808 imposed Islam on the Hausa majority in the north, fusing the Hausa states. British attempts at colonization were resisted but were finally successful. Resentment against Western influence has remained. The northern population opposed activities of early Christian missionaries who used western education for evangelism.

2.1 Literature Review

2.1.1 Transnational Terrorist Groups

Andrew and Michael (2008) identify the parameters for the expansion of transnational terrorism to include the following:

1. Cross-border businesses, investments and remittances.
2. Transnational families with members having dual citizenships or some members belong to one country while the other belongs to the other.
3. Multi-plant firms have branches in different countries.
4. Migration causing movement of large populations for various reasons.

Transnational terrorism is intimately linked to other violent crimes like money laundering, armed robbery, theft of arts and cultural artifacts, child trafficking, sea piracy, illicit drug trafficking, and fraudulent dealings with foreign exchange. The principal characteristics of these crimes are that they have the potential to spread across national borders and so have been described as (inter-state) crimes; hence, such offenses have an international character (Stenersen, Anne, 2008). The assessment of transnational crimes are not limited to cross-border criminal activities but includes crimes whose scope, nature and intensity are composed of cross-border elements as an intrinsic part of inference of the criminal behavior or activity. This means that transnational

crimes occur in one country, and the consequences and effect are felt in other nations at different levels.

Transnational concerns could also be viewed from the historical and geographic perspective. During the scramble for Africa in the nineteenth century, European powers set boundaries between many African states arbitrarily. These boundaries divided ethnic groups and created transnational ethnic linkages fostering sub-national ethnic conflicts. Boko Haram's birth in Maiduguri, a city located in the Northeastern corner of Nigeria, bordered by Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, places itself within a predominantly Hausa-speaking population that has linguistic, cultural, and ethnic ties to its neighbors increasing the risk of conflict spillover.

2.1.2 The Emergence and Evolution of Boko Haram

Tawil (2015), opines that Boko Haram is just a continuation of the violent movements that plagued Northern Nigeria in the 1980s during Maitatsine Uprising. However, its activities only became globally recognized in 2000. Boko Haram is the traditional name of the militant Islamist and terrorist group Ahl al-Sunna li al Da'wawa al-Jihad (Tawil, 2015). The name Boko Haram means "Western education or civilization is forbidden." In this regard, the group preaches against Western influence such as attending government schools and universities, and having government jobs (Witting and Timothy, 2011). There are different accounts of when and how Boko Haram emerged in Nigeria. However, the most detailed argument and study trace the origins of Boko Haram to the northern Nigerian city of Maiduguri. In 2002, a group of radical youths who had worshiped at a local mosque named Alhaji Muhammadu Nidimi declared that the Nigerian Islamic establishment was intolerably corrupt and broke away from the mosque. They establish separatist community based on strict Islamic principles in the village of Kanama, near the border with Niger. They preached an anti-state ideology and called for other Muslims to withdraw from society and return to life under "pure" Islamic law. It has been claimed that this was the beginning of Boko Haram, although that name was not yet in use (Onuoha, 2010). At this early stage, the group was also labeled "the Nigerian Taliban", though there was no evidence that they had any links to the Taliban in Afghanistan or other international jihadists' organization (Onuoha, 2010).

In December 2003, the group came into conflict with police over a community dispute concerning fishing rights (Militant Leadership Monitor, 2012a), and following the incident the army took siege of the group's mosque (Walker, 2012). As a result, some members of the group

were killed during the conflict, including the leader Mohammed Yusuf in police custody. In 2004, the survivors returned to Maiduguri and rejoined the youth group originating from the Alhaji Muhammadu Mosque, which was now led by an Islamic cleric named Mohammed Yusuf. While their activities at the time seemed collective for development and humanitarian concern they continued to work for the Islamist cause and eventually the group became known as Boko Haram (Walker, 2012). The group enjoyed a youthful following and support which provided them the opportunity to consolidate its base and idea to declare a Sharia rule in the Northern states. In the beginning, Boko Haram was mainly focused upon withdrawal from society. The leader, Mohammed Yusuf, preached against what he saw as the failure of the modern lifestyles of Nigerian Muslims as not Islamic. He also criticized the 12 northern states which had recently adopted Sharia for not implementing it correctly (Mehaan and Speier, 2011). He advocated a purer way of Islamic life away from western excesses of life and constructed a mosque for the group on land owned by his father-in-law. The mosque was named (IbnTamiyyah Masjid) after a 14th Century Islamic scholar. To consolidate its sense of community and humanitarian purpose the group was established around the mosque, with a cabinet, its religious police and a large farm (Walker, 2012). The sense of organization and community led the group to focus on recruiting new members and assembling resources (Militant Leadership Monitor, 2012).

The practice of the group was based on the strict interpretation of the holy Koran called Wahabism – an extremely fundamentalist approach to Islam encouraged by Saudi Arabia. The difference in interpretation and of the Koran plus increasing following of the group's doctrine laid the foundations for potential conflict with local authorities and the population. There were tensions with the local population, and the group conducted occasional attacks on activities and places it saw as immoral, such as bars, smokers, and card players. Although clashes with the police also occurred, they were short-lived and never evolved into an organized armed struggle against the state (Bøås, 2012). In 2009, Boko Haram clashed with the authorities when members of the group who were on their way to a funeral were stopped by the police because they were not wearing motorcycle helmets. An argument ensued followed by shooting which left many injured (Walker, 2012). The group then attacked police stations and other government buildings in the northeastern states of Yobe and Bauchi, as well as Mosques and Churches killing several police officers (Onuoha, 2010). The military responded, and five days of fighting left more than 800 killed, most of them Boko Haram members (Militant Leadership Monitor, 2012). On the fourth day of the crackdown, on July 30th, 2009, Boko Haram's leader Mohammed Yusuf was

captured, and he later died in police custody. The police report claimed that Yusuf was killed by security forces in a shootout while trying to escape, but Human Rights Watch in Nigeria have labeled the killing, “extrajudicial” and “illegal” (BBC News July 31, 2009). The death of Yusuf marked the end of the first, relatively calm period of Boko Haram’s evolution. The police continued to hunt for Boko Haram members and sympathizers, making arrests and confiscating their property as they fled.

2.1.3 Philosophical Trajectories (Timeline) of Boko Haram

According to Walker (2012), 2000 to 2009, marked the transformation of Boko Haram to a violent group that began challenging state authority. The strong response from the state machinery of Nigeria, which led to the death of the leader of the group forced other members to flee and sort refuge. After the 2009 clash with the police, Nigerian intelligence suggested that some members joined other Jihad groups in Algeria. This view by Walker (2012) has been supported by Reuters, who hold that the fleeing members went as far as Somalia, Mali and Cameroon. However, by September 2010, Boko Haram was back in Nigeria under a new leader, Abubakar Mohammad Shekau, Yusuf’s former second in command. In September 2010, the group raided a prison in Bauchi State and freed about 700 inmates, including 100 Boko Haram members (Militant Leadership Monitor 2012). This attack marked the start of a new trajectory in the evolution of Boko Haram. The group’s assaults have become more frequent and advanced. From performing only a few attacks a year with small hand weapons and knives before 2009, Boko Haram in this second phase began conducting almost weekly attacks using improvised explosives, and by 2011, suicide bombs had become their preferred method. The growing sophistication and frequency of attacks have been accompanied by increased casualties, with the number of people killed in attacks attributed to Boko Haram increasing from about 100 in 2010 to almost 800 in 2012 (Ofstedal, 2013).

The geographic spread of the attacks has also widened. In the beginning, most of Boko Haram’s operations were carried out in the North Eastern states of Borno, Yobe, Bauchi and Kano. However, in 2011, the group attacked as Far West as Sokoto State, and as Far South as the cities of Yola and Abuja (Cook, 2011). In February 2013, the group conducted its first attack outside Nigeria, when it kidnapped a French family in Northern Cameroon near the border with Nigeria (Bey and Tack, 2013). The cross-border operations in Cameroon marked the transnational trajectory of the group. Boko Haram has gradually strengthened its capabilities and reach over the years. The group did not claim responsibility for any suicide attacks in 2013, limiting its

operations to Borno and Yobe State (Cook, 2013). There is little doubt that Boko Haram today is stronger and deadlier than when it first emerged under Yusuf. According to Bøås (2012), whereas Boko Haram in its first phase “focused on a combination of preaching, recruitment, and violent resistance against the state, the strategy of Boko Haram in its second phase is the spectacular drama of transnational violence.

According to Zenn (2012), the cause for this shift appears to have been the killing of Mohammed Yusuf and the emergence of a new, more radical leadership. Additional factors that have been attributed to the persistence and radicalization of Boko Haram include poverty, inequality and political marginalization of the North. Support for Boko Haram is linked to discontented politicians who sought to delegitimize the government of Goodluck Jonathan, excessive use of violence by the security forces and traditions of religious fundamentalism. In consideration of the above points, this thesis explores whether transnational factors and actors may have played a role in this development (George and Bennett 2005). The aim of the group is not clear and what Boko Haram wants to achieve through its attacks is ambivalent due to its rhetoric and increasing target of civilians. The group has not issued any major ideological declaration stating its aims or program. However, based on several other statements made by the group, media interviews with some prominent leaders and the choice of targets, it is possible to identify some of Boko Haram’s central aims. (Premium Times, 2012). The group’s objectives and ideology concentrates on three main issues as outlined by (Messner, 2012).

- 1) Boko Haram demands the introduction of Sharia in the whole of Nigeria, as well as stricter implementation in the 12 Northern states which have already adopted it.
- 2) Boko Haram is preoccupied with broader issues of governance, including overthrowing the government, removing democracy, ensuring that Muslims rule Nigeria.
- 3) Boko Haram wants vengeance, particularly against the security forces for the killing of its former leader Muhammad Yusuf, but also more generally against the Nigerian authorities, whom Boko Haram accuses of corruption, repression, and violence (Ofstedal 2013). Since mid-2011, there has also been an increasing focus on Christians in Boko Haram’s rhetoric and targeting practices.

Boko Haram is part of global Jihad to restitute Muslim fortunes and domination in Islamic lands divided and controlled by the Western Alliance led by the US. Wendt (1994) also highlights that

the political and global view is to challenge the existing or contemporary world order dominated by the US as can be seen in the pattern and strategy of operations which shows the geography and history of the relations between the West and the Islamic world. Al Qaeda and ISIS are carrying out war to reconstitute the defunct Ottoman Empire as can be seen in the map of Caliphate or occupied territory by ISIS in the Arabian Peninsula. The scope and geography of the territory occupied and then lost by Boko Haram to the Multinational Task Force is a representation of the defunct Kanem Borno. The territory of Kanem Borno stretched from Northeastern Nigeria to the North of Cameroon and Southwest of Chad and Southeast of Niger across the desert to the South of Libya. Increasing and emerging terrorist activities are sprawling across West Africa indicating a strategy of the Islamization of the whole of West Africa from at least the north of Cameroon.

More than 20 churches have been attacked and over 200 people killed in attacks on churches across central and northern Nigeria since 2010 (Amnesty International, 2014). Boko Haram has accepted responsibility for many of the attacks and has explicitly stated that it aims to target Christians and drive them out of the northern Nigeria (Amnesty International, 2014; Cooker 2012). However, it is worth noting that the ideology expressed in official statements may not be shared by all Boko Haram members. There have been reports about internal disagreements and fragmentation according to Oftedal (2013). In January 2012, a group known as Ansaru announced its formation although its exact relationship with Boko Haram remains unclear. According to Militant Leadership Monitor (2012), Ansaru is most likely a breakaway faction from Boko Haram because of disagreements over Boko Haram's killing of Muslims, which Ansaru has characterized as 'inhumane' and "inexcusable".

Ansaru is suspected to have been involved in six major incidents: four kidnappings of foreigners, an attack on a detention facility in Abuja, and an attack on Nigerian soldiers heading for Mali (Zenn, 2013). While six incidents are insufficient to draw any firm conclusions, Ansaru seems to be more anti-Western and internationally oriented in its targeting practice than Shekau's Boko Haram. For instance, Ansaru claimed responsibility for kidnapping a French engineer from his residence in Katsina State in December 2012, saying that it would continue to attack the French government and its citizens until France ended its ban on the Islamic veil and its "significant role" in the planned intervention in Mali (BBC News December 24, 2012). In January 2013, Ansaru killed at least two soldiers and wounded eight others when it attacked a military convoy en route to deployment with French and West African forces in Mali. The group claimed the attack was part of a mission to stop Nigerian troops joining Western powers in their "aim to

demolish the Islamic empire of Mali” (Reuters January 20, 2013). Although Boko Haram’s objectives appear to be more nationally focused, there is no contradiction between Boko Haram focusing on national issues and having transnational connections and ambitions. Boko Haram receives funding, training, logistics and recruits from outside Nigeria and its activities, and suicide bombings now occur across the border in Cameroon, Chad, and Mali. The porous borders and extensive cross-national transactions in the region mean that Boko Haram may easily have effects in Nigeria’s neighboring countries. Consequently, focusing on the group’s objectives and pattern of attacks makes the perspective of transnationalism more relevant for understanding the group.

2.1.4 The Socio-Cultural Drivers of Boko Haram’s Transnationalization

Nigeria is undoubtedly home to a variety of religions which tend to vary regionally. This situation intensifies regional and ethnic distinctions and has often been seen as a source of sectarian conflict amongst the population (Osita, 2004). Various surveys, however, give slightly differing figures for the size of religious groups in Nigeria, which by 2010 appears to be roughly split half and a half between Muslims and Christians with a minority who practice traditional religion. Osaghae and Suberu (2005) have also noted that, of these three religious identities in Nigeria-Muslim, Christian, and Traditional, the latter is the least politically active; numbering several hundreds of ethnic groups and subgroups, kin groups, clans and villages; and, involving the worship of several gods and goddesses alike. The majority of Nigerian Muslims are Sunni, though a significant Shia primarily located in the north-western state of Sokoto (Nigeria National Population Commission and ORC Macro, 2004) and a Sufi minority exists alongside a small minority of Ahmadiyya. It should be noted that other minority religious and spiritual groups in Nigeria include Judaism, Hinduism, The Rosicrucian Order, Freemasonry, Grail Movement, Hare Krishnas (Freedman, 2004), Eckankar, The Bahá’í Faith, and Chrislam which is a syncretic faith melding elements of Christianity and Islam (Pauline, 2015) aimed at controlling feuds among Nigerians.

With regards to religious affiliations, Nigeria is also divided along the line of religion and ethnicity. While for instance the Hausa ethnic group in the North is 95% Muslim and 5% Christian, the West, which is the Yoruba tribe, is 60% Christians and 30% Muslims with 10% adhering to other traditional African religions while the Igbos in the south-east and the Ijaws in the South are 98% Christians (mostly Catholics) and 2% African traditional religions. The middle belt region sometimes referred to as the north-central zone, and home of the minority are

mostly Christians and traditionalists with few Muslim converts (National Population Commission of Nigeria (NPC, 2009). It was perhaps for this unique and conspicuous religious divide that Archbishop Stenersen (2008) described Nigeria as “the greatest Islamo-Christian nation in the world” by which he meant that Nigeria is the largest country in the world with an evenly split population of Christians and Muslims, and thus “really the test case of the ‘clash of civilizations,” (Paden, 2007). Christianity and Islam, the most popular religions in Nigeria, are not native to the country, and yet their influences affect the core and the essence of the country, from economic development to health.

The subject of religion has always been an important part of Nigeria and her politics (Enwerem, 1995), influencing core aspects from economic development to health. “The intensity of religious identity in Nigeria is regarded as one of the highest in the world” (Paden, 2007). This argument is connected on the fact that Nigerians are more likely to define themselves regarding religion than any other identity. According to a 2006 survey on “Religion and Public Life” conducted by Pew; 76% of Christians say that religion is more important to them than their Nigerian or African identities, or even as members of a particular ethnic group. Amidst Muslims, the number naming religion as the most significant factor is even higher (91%). In effect, Christian and Muslim identities have been the mainstay of religious differentiation and conflict, with Muslims in Nigeria much more likely to evince or articulate a religious identity than Christians (Lewis and Bratton, 2000; Lewis, 2007). Spotting such religious identity plays out in the deep distrust between the Muslims and Christians. A Pew Survey noted that most of the country’s Christians (62%) trust people from other religions only a little or not at all. On the other hand, Nigeria’s Muslims (61%) say they trust people of other religions little or not at all (Ruby and Shah, 2007). Similarly, religion is also reflected in the Nigerian legal and judicial system which contains three codes of law: customary law, Nigerian statute law (following English law), and Sharīah (Islamic law).

Customary laws are most times administered in native or customary courts. The cases which often centred on generally family problems are usually presided over by traditional rulers. Kadis (judges) apply Sharīah based on the Maliki Islamic code. Since 1999, several states have also instituted Sharīah law. Although these countries claim that the law applies only to the Muslim population, other non-Muslim minority in the North claimed they are affected as well. Part of Boko Haram objective as we shall see in the Islamization of the entire Nigeria, at least this was visible after 2009 (Ruby and Shah, 2007).

According to Olojo (2013), it is important to draw attention briefly to another historical detail that may have also fed into the contemporary dynamics of support for Boko Haram's rise and insurgency. Before British colonization, the current region of north-eastern Nigeria was a territory under the sovereign control of the Bornu Empire, composed of a majority of Kanuri-Muslims. However, the imposition of British control contributed to an increased allegiance of the local people to the Bornu Sultanate, as well as profound dissatisfaction with the activities of the British authorities. It can be argued that this kindled the rise of fundamentalism among the Kanuri. Although this anti-colonial discontent was not unique to only the Kanuri people, it could help to explain aspects of the genesis of sympathy and popular support for Boko Haram.

The above analysis is valuable in pointing out the role of ethnicity and religion with regards to the present security challenges facing the Lake Chad basin area. These two factors interact alongside other variables such as region in a complex and sometimes conflicting way. In fact, it is the realization of this that the term ethnoreligious identity was coined to capture the tendency for the boundary between ethnicity and religion to coalesce during moments of conflict and violence (Egwu, 2001). It should also be noted that the affected regions in the Far North and Northern Regions of Cameroon have a majority of the people as Muslims, and they are of Hausa and Kanuri ethnicity. The Kanem – Borno people of Chad and Niger also comprised of a majority of them being Muslims. It is for this reason that the Boko Haram sect is fighting to establish an Islamic state in the affected regions to extend the Shariah law to the entire country.

Scott (2012) opines that apart from the English language spoken as the official language in Nigeria, major languages are spoken however include Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, Fulfulde (Fula), Kanuri, Ibibio and English Creole (pidgin). Those in the rural area speak these national languages. Many of the other languages only exist in written form as English remains the language widely used especially by an urban elite for education, business transactions, and other official purposes. Specific languages are also associated with the various major ethnic groups, for instance, the Yoruba speak Yoruba, the Igbo speak Igbo, and the Hausa speak Hausa. Again, English and French are spoken in Cameroon as the official languages with over 200 local languages spoken the local areas. Pidgin English is also spoken widely in the territory. Scott (2012) is also of the opinion that in the three Northern regions of Cameroon Fulfulde (Fula), Kanuri and Hausa are widely spoken. The French language is used as the official languages in Chad and Niger, while Hausa and Fulfulde (Fula), Kanuri are widely spoken in the countries and

precisely around the Boko Haram affected zone. Due to similar cultural identities in ethnicity, language, religion the people in the Boko Haram affected region can easily identify themselves with the sect members.

Furthermore, the African continental context is characterized by varied and thriving Borderland cultures. As Miles puts it, local perceptions of boundaries in Africa demonstrate “an overall penchant towards fluidity, permeability, and porosity as opposed to obstruction, obstacle, and interdiction. The people living on either side of the borders often share a host of ethnic, linguistic and cultural affinities which explain their tight border socio-economic relations. Illustrative examples at the Nigerian Benin borders are the Beriba, Fulani, Hausa and Yoruba societies. These people have a history of solidarity which tends to enhance their commercial relationships. Similarly, the border areas between Cameroon and Niger reveal existing proximity based on an established bottom-up economic region.

Nigeria's economy is predicted to continue growing; poverty continues to grow as the gap between the wealthy, and the have-nots continue to widen. According to Dr. Yemi Kale, Statistician-General of the Federation, "it remains a paradox that despite the fact that the Nigerian economy is growing, the proportion of Nigerians living in poverty is increasing every year." The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) also noted that as at 2010, the percentage of Nigerians living in absolute poverty, those who can afford only the bare essentials of food, shelter and clothing, rose to 60.9 percent (99.284 million), compared with 54.7 percent in 2004. The data also showed that 61.2 percent of Nigerians lived on less than \$1 per day in 2010, compared to 51.6 percent in 2004. According to Briscoe and Van Last (2011), one significant factor that has stimulated the drive towards violent extremism, recruitment, and support for Boko Haram are economic deprivation. Abject poverty and economic disruption of livelihoods have drastically decreased the options of many young Nigerians in the northern region. Deducing from the structural violence paradigm, individual and group grievances, such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalization, can be used as mobilizing instruments by sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist violence. As this part will highlight, in the distinct context of Nigeria, it is the combination of these factors that Boko Haram has utilized in a bid to gain assistance for its activities in northern Nigeria. In May 2013, the Nigerian government freed dozens of women and teenagers previously kept as relatives of assumed Boko Haram members. Among the youths were persons who confessed to already accepting payments of 5,000 Nigerian Naira from Boko

Haram militants, who in turn provided them with kegs of fuel to set schools ablaze in Maiduguri, Borno State (Ibrahim and Matazu, 2013). This is indicative of the economic concern expressed by thousands of youths who have been rendered vulnerable by the shortcomings of Nigeria's leadership over several decades. According to Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the measure of relative poverty is most apparent in the northern region. In relation with the southeast and southwest zones, which have relative poverty rates of 67.0% and 59.1% respectively, the north-east and northwest regions have higher figures of 76.3% and 77.7% of relative poverty.

Regarding other vital indicators such as the education of girls, Cook (2013) opines that there are similar models of inequality with the Northern region having much lower enrolment rates compared with the south. However, it is essential to point out that the variation in overall deprivation levels between the North and South is also a consequence of poor governance by successive Northern leaders in their constituencies. The phenomenon of the "youth bulge" in Africa and particularly in Nigeria has further increased the steady supply of economically-deprived individuals who have become susceptible to recruitment by Boko Haram (Cooker 2011). With almost 200 million persons aged between 15 and 24, Africa has one of the growing population groups in the world, and it is growing rapidly. While Nigeria is firmly within the category of a very young age structure, with nearly three-quarters of its population under the age of 30, political violence inspired by marginalized youths in the country are stark reminders of the negative consequence remarkably large and mismanaged youth populations can exert across the world. Although many scholars are justified in pointing out that the connection between poverty, education and terrorism is indirect and complicated, the huge number of young people living on the margins of Nigerian society intensifies these linkages.

2.1.5 The Cross-Border Cooperation and Lake Chad Area Countries and Counter Terrorism

According to Pérouse de Montclos (2014), Boko Haram has long been present in countries neighboring North-Eastern Nigeria. From a structural point of view, the weakness of states in this region, the porosity of their borders, the significance of their history and their ethnic ties with the Adamawa people in Cameroon or the Kanem-Borno in Niger and Chad apparently performed a role. However, since 2009, pressure from the Nigerian Army has caused Boko Haram's leaders to settled to a strategy of scattering (taqiyya) like the Sultan of Sokoto in 1903, who called his followers to disband to avoid being defeated by the British (France 24, March 2,

2013). Because of the cultural, religious and geographic closeness with Borno, the blind spot that is the region of Diffa, in the Southeast of the Republic of Niger, is naturally at the forefront of the crisis. Traditionally, its Koranic students would go to Nigeria to study Islam. With British colonization, the city of Maiduguri also became the starting point for pilgrimages to Mecca, using a modern airport built by the Allies during the Second World War. More than 1300km away from Niamey, the region of Diffa developed economically and religiously under the influence of its powerful English-speaking neighbor. Today, every Islamic movement that can be seen in Nigeria can also be found there: from dominating Sufi brotherhoods such as Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya to the Salafi movement Izala and the Yan Shia, ideologically close to the Muslim Brothers (Pérouse de Montclos, 2015).

Pérouse de Montclos (2015), posits that Cameroon was not saved either from the influence of Muhammed Yusuf's supporters, especially in the Mandara Mountains. Just like in Niger, the porosity of boundaries and cultural proximity reveal the smoothness with which the sect spilled over beyond Borno State in Nigeria. On the tarmac stretch between Maiduguri and Ndjamen, Boko Haram's fiefdom in Dikwa, for example, was Cameroonian before the departure of the German colonial master in 1914. Historically, the Kanuri people from Borno have had a significant political and religious impact on Northern Cameroon. An Islamic prophet from Northern Cameroon, Muhammadu Marwa "Maitatsine", started an Islamic resistance that defeated Kano in Nigeria in 1980. MamanNur, who is said to have ordered the Boko Haram attacks against the United Nations offices in Abuja in 2011, also comes from Northern Cameroon, a region where, in the 1970s, President Ahmadu Ahidjo destroyed the mosques of the Tarabiyya action, a branch of the Tijaniyya that advocated "moral education" and whose preachers had to go into exile in Nigeria.

Pérouse de Montclos (2015) further points out that "militants" also went to find refuge in the Mandara Mountains when they were sent out of Kanama by the Nigerian security forces at the start of 2004. The sect used villages in Cameroon to have supplies of arms, and for training and recruitment. On the border, this was the case with Banki and Amchidé, where Boko Haram fought many battles in 2014. On the Nigerian side, Banki was a center for smuggling, with an imposing mosque and the villas of wealthy Borno families such as the Tudjani. On the Cameroonian part, Amchidé had a health center and several bars where Bornuans would go to look for girls to escape the dry regime of the Sharia law, which banned alcohol after 2002.

According to Pérouse de Montclos (2014), Chad is divided from Nigeria by a lake that can now be crossed on foot during the dry season and is a slightly different case in point. Originally, it was less affected than Niger and Cameroon by the preachers of Boko Haram. Historically, in fact, animist fishing communities such as the Budumas have used the islands of Lake Chad for shelter to resist Islamisation from Borno. Nevertheless, ministers from Idriss Deby's government were curious enough to go to Maiduguri to attend Mohammed Yusuf's preaching before the Nigerian police assassinated him in 2009 (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014). Pérouse de Montclos (2014) asserts that increasing pressure from the military in Nigeria let Boko Haram leaders to use Chad as a shelter. So were their enemies like Borno's controversial governor, Ali Modu Sheriff. In office from 2003 to 2011, he settled in Ndjamena at the end of his mandate and created a company, SAS Petroleum, which is run by a former Chadian oil minister, Eugene Tabe. Since he is thought to be responsible for the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, Ali Modu Sheriff is on Boko Haram's black list. He also used the sect to win the regional elections. These links allowed him to act as a mediator for Chad, although he did fail to negotiate a ceasefire in 2014.

Boko Haram members could travel undisturbed around this area thanks to a mutual non-aggression pact. But everything yurned around when Niger, Chad, and Cameroon announced that they would cooperate with Nigeria to clear out the movement. On the ground, malice began at the level of police operations. At the Waza Game Reserve of Cameroon in February 2013, for instance, the sect abducted expatriates for the first time (the Moulin-Fournier family) when the gendarmerie arrested around ten Boko Haram activists (Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon, 2015). Since then, the confrontations went from bad to worse. According to Pérouse de Montclos (2015), the sect succeeded in bringing together criminal groups who claimed to be Boko Haram and launched cross-border attacks which were not necessarily directed by Abubakar Shekau, the successor to Mohammed Yusuf. This is the situation of Fulani highway robbers such as the kontakonta ("lie down") in Niger or the zargina ("covered faces") in Cameroon. Amongst refugees, Boko Haram also hired victims of brutality and forced induction attempts by the Nigerian army and their militia Yan Gora ("those carrying the stick"). In Borno, civilians were trapped in the crossfire. Every time the survivors came back to their villages to pick up the corpses after an attack, they risked being accused of complicity with the enemy and being killed by the army or by Boko Haram.

The sect's increase strategy is hard to explain, especially since the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf and the takeover of the movement by Abubakar Shekau. According to

Seignobos (2015) Boko Haram, wants to seal off “a pure Islamic land”, destroying the bridges which link Borno with neighboring countries and the Nigerian State of Gombe. In August 2014 in Fotokol, for example, Cameroon’s rapid reaction battalions, the BIR (Bataillons d’Intervention Rapide), had to push back rebels who were trying to blow up the main bridge on the road between Maiduguri and Ndjamena, near Gambaru. Boko Haram still fought with primary weapons. In Northern Cameroon, they used Chinese test motorbikes to start attacks on settlements close to the border, as was the case on the Torou Road close to Mokolo in September 2014. These motorcycles are handled by so-called cascadeurs (“acrobats”) with a server and a gunner at the back (Seignobos, 2015)

To fight against insecurity along Cameroon and Nigeria shared a border, the two countries signed an Agreement on the establishment of a Cross Border Security Committee (CST) on February 28, 2012, in Abuja. In this connection, a meeting between the officials in charge of surveillance and intelligence gathering was fixed (Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon, 2015). The fight against Boko Haram is a major concern between the two countries. Cameroon has reorganized its military structures in the northern region. The fourth inter-military region (RMIA4), a fourth police region and the 41st motorized infantry brigade (4th BRIM) were created in August 2014. Heavy military equipment and 6,000 men deployed in the Far North to defend the country’s territory.

The Cameroon-Nigeria Cross Border Security Committee held its first session on November 6-8, 2013 in Yaounde. The second session was on July 8-11, 2014 in Abuja. Yaounde hosted the third meeting on February 18-20, 2015. Recommendations to jointly fight effectively against crime, in general, have been developed. From January 16-19, 2015, a workshop on cross-border cooperation was held in Uyo, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria. This workshop identified several areas of common interest that require collaboration between the two countries, to develop the border areas. The cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria was strengthened through the release of the seven French hostages kidnapped in Cameroon by Boko Haram on February 19, 2013, and published on April 19, 2013. A French priest was kidnapped on November 14, 2013. Security cooperation between the two countries led to the release of the priest on December 31, 2013. This was same for some Chinese and Cameroonian hostages adopted from the Waza Park.

According to the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon (2015) the fight against Boko Haram, brought together the leaders of Benin, Cameroon, France, Nigeria, Niger and Chad and also the

agents of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the European Union took part in a summit on security in Nigeria held in Paris on 17 May 2014. The summit was an occasion for the intensification of regional and international mobilization to fight against the Boko Haram terrorist group. The meeting ended with several decisions which aimed to strengthen cooperation amongst the states in the region, not only to liberate the young girls who were taken hostage but also to intensify the fight against Boko Haram. The allies at the meeting (France, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the European Union) committed themselves to support this regional cooperation and to increase the international means required to fight Boko Haram and to protect the victims. All the states reasserted their loyalty to the respect of human rights; in particular, the protection of the rights of young girls, who are victims of violence, forced marriages or threatened with slavery. Follow-up meetings to implement resolutions of the summit held on June 12, 2014, in London, August 5, 2014, were in Washington, September 3, 2014, in Abuja and on January 20, 2015, in Niamey, Nigeria. As part of the fight against insecurity in Nigeria. Follow-up meetings to implement resolutions of the summit held on June 12, 2014, in London, August 5, 2014, were in Washington, September 3, 2014, in Abuja and on January 20, 2015, in Niamey, Nigeria.

Resolutions to foster regional cooperation after the Paris summit were to ensure that Nigeria and its neighbors will develop the capacity to analyze and to react thereby contributing to strengthen the safety of the population and the rule of law in all the zones hit by the terrorist activities of Boko Haram. To fight against the threat emanating from Boko Haram, which of recent carried out several deadly attacks and kidnapped over 270 school girls, Nigeria, and its neighbors decided to immediately:

1. On bilateral bases

- Institute mixed patrols that are well organized to fight Boko Haram and search for the missing persons.
- Put in place a method of intelligence sharing so as to sustain this operational action.
- Put in place mechanisms for the exchange of information on arms trafficking and reinforce measures to secure arms stocks.
- Put in place tools for the monitoring of borders.

2. On multilateral bases.

- Put in place a unit for the convergence of intelligence.
- Institute a team dedicated to the identification of the means to be required and also to elaborate a regional strategy for the fight against Boko Haram within the Lake Chad Basin Commission.
- This approach is a follow-up to the Lake Chad Basin Commission, which took place in 2012. The United States, the United Kingdom, France and the European Union will coordinate their support to this regional cooperation: technical expertise, training programs, and support to programs for the management of frontier areas.

On January 29, 2015, the African Union officially supported the putting in place of the Multinational Joint Task Force of the LCBC and Benin. A meeting for the development of the rules of engagement was held in Yaounde on February 5-7, 2015. The documents produced were forwarded to the AU, which submitted them to the UN Security Council for adoption. However, Nigeria has changed its position on the idea of a vote in the UN Security Council. At an Extraordinary Summit of the LCBC on June 11, 2015, in Abuja, Nigeria opted for the enhancement of cooperation between the countries of the LCBC and Benin. The 8,700-man coalition force shall consist mainly of Nigerian soldiers under the command of a Nigerian-born General Tukur Burutai. Its headquarters shall be based in N'Djamena, Chad. Nigeria pledged to donate 100 million US dollars. Furthermore, ECCAS, after the February 2015 extraordinary COPAX summit in Yaounde, designated Heads of State of the Republic of Congo and the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to meet with Nigerian and Ghanaian authorities for the organization of an ECOWAS-ECCAS Summit for the adoption of a bi-regional strategy against Boko Haram. The ECOWAS-ECCAS Summit, originally scheduled for April 2015 was postponed indefinitely

2.1.5.1 The Shortcomings of the Cross-Border Cooperation and Lake Chad Area Countries and Counter Terrorism

Pérouse de Montclos (2015) posits that efforts to create military cooperation have faced both institutional and political obstacles, and the results have been poor performance of the arm forces war against Boko Haram. In October 2014, Nigeria declared a ceasefire and Chad disclosed the pending liberation of the Chibok schoolgirls, yet at the same moment, Cameroon was starting an

attack against Boko Haram in Amchidé, which shows a entire lack of coordination. On that occasion, the three armies further disgraced themselves: in the end, there was no amnesty, no captive liberation, and no military victory. As concerns the MJTF (Multilateral Joint Task Force), which was to bring together troops from Nigeria, Niger, and Chad, its joint border patrols almost stopped after the Paris conference which, in May 2014, was supposed to promote military cooperation.

Pérouse de Montclos (2015) further points out that in early January 2015 in Nigeria, insurgents thus overtook the Baga military barracks, which housed the MJTF command. This incident further highlighted the inability of the region's armies to contain Boko Haram. Since then, Chad has deployed troops in Niger and Cameroon, hinting at the possibility of a greater military involvement of the French-speaking countries. It also managed to get the MJTF command shifted from Baga to Ndjamena. However, the readiness of Chadian armed forces to take the reins from Nigeria's declining military is coming up against resistance from the English-speaking giant, which does not want foreign troops on its land. In practice, Abuja refused to let Chad take over the Baga military base and did not authorize Cameroon to exercise its right of pursuit beyond the border – although this did not prevent Ndjamena and Yaoundé from bombarding the rebels on the Nigerian side.

According to Pérouse de Montclos (2015), the political ill will, the depth of corruption in the Nigerian military institution does not leave much hope for military cooperation. Soldiers deployed in Borno lack munitions and are not always paid because the money is misappropriated in Abuja, which disheartens the troops and leads to mutiny. Also, the Nigerian army often shoots civilians, which limits the support of local communities, without which it is impossible to win an asymmetrical war against an invisible enemy such as Boko Haram. Finally, the decision-making process is very fragile in a federal system which sets the opposition and central powers in charge of the Borno region against one another. Pérouse de Montclos (2014) asserts that the armed forces could be more efficient in centralized countries such as Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. But their military capability is equally limited by financial, political, demographic and geographic reasons. First, Niger is a huge, sparsely populated country, and it has Jihadist fronts in Mali and Libya to bother about. In the Southeast in 2014, it originated Operation Ngaa ("Shield") to seal its border with Nigeria. To prevent any misconduct which could upset the local communities, the authorities were careful to put the National Guard on the front line and the army behind, in support.

In comparison, Cameroon appears more determined to fight Boko Haram. But its strengths are also its weaknesses. Its centralized structure makes it difficult to take action: prefects in the North must wait for orders from Yaoundé before making the smallest of decisions. Also, Cameroon suffers the same evils as Nigeria when it comes to corruption, institutional weakness and the duplication of command chains. In the north, its security forces have never ended arms trafficking or prevent attacks by the highway robbers zargina. The state does not have a firm presence, so people must turn to the rebels. One example in Fotokol is the mayor's complicity with a Boko Haram arms trafficker, Abakar Ali, who was arrested in Kousséri in September 2014 and set free a month later, in exchange for the liberation of Chinese and Cameroonian captives who were being held by insurgents (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014).

As with Nigeria, corruption is rife in the security forces. During a revolt in December 2012, which was quickly contained, "patriotic soldiers" from the presidential guard protested against salary embezzlements and misappropriations (Pérouse de Montclos, 2015). Cameroon is also encountering serious problems similar to those in Nigeria regarding coordination. In fact, the regular army and the BIR (Rapid Reaction Battalions) have two different chains of command, with the former financed by the Ministry of Defence, and the latter by the National Oil Company SNH (Société Nationale des Hydro-carbures). This unique treatment causes permanent tensions: the BIR are decidedly privileged, and bypass the military hierarchy, taking orders directly from President Paul Biya's own General Staff. The BIR was in fact created to protect the presidential palace in the city of Yaoundé, and not for combat in the Sahel.

Pérouse de Montclos (2015) points out that the countries of the region are already destabilized by the flow of refugees coming from Nigeria, and their military involvement is not sufficient. The fight against Boko Haram has put increasing pressure on political regimes, which were already fragile in Niger an authoritarian, and challenged in Cameroon and Chad. Following the aegis of the African Union and the LCBC, there are at least the beginnings of cooperation between the francophone countries' armed forces. However, English-speaking Nigeria is not part of it, and any solution to the crisis could only be achieved with Abuja's involvement. Aside from the fact that this is an extra source of pressures, the combined military weight of the francophone countries is still not enough to compensate for the weaknesses of this African giant. Therefore it is in Abuja that the international community must concentrate their efforts.

Apparently, it is important to weigh up the possible positive and adverse effects of over-militarization in response to Boko Haram. For now, pressure from the Nigerian and Cameroonian armies has not been effective: they have not ended the sect's violence and have also damaged connections with parts of the population in Borno, without which it is difficult to win an asymmetrical war. There is no reason to consider that Chadian forces will do any better, given their poor history in the Central African Republic. Therefore, it was difficult to expect results from setting up a Pan African Force, especially one which runs the risk of being not more than cooperation between French-speaking countries, and which would remain limited by Nigeria's ill will. Granted that the potential of military response is limited other options must be considered, such as humanitarian aid or the reinforcement of basic public services to legitimize the weakest states or the negotiation of sanctuary or amnesty for the rebels.

2.1.6 The Geographical Enablers of Boko Haram's Transnationalization

Historical and geographic factors also present transnational concerns. During the scramble for Africa in the nineteenth century, European powers drew the borders of many African states arbitrarily, which often divided ethnic groups creating transnational ethnic linkages – or enclosed many different ethnic groups-fostering sub-national ethnic conflicts (Englebert, 2000). Boko Haram's origin in Maiduguri, a city located in the Northeastern corner of Nigeria, bordered by Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, situates itself within a predominantly Hausa-speaking population that has linguistic, cultural, and ethnic ties to its neighbors – increasing the risk of conflict spill-over. This, therefore, means that the area affected by the Boko Haram is made up of people who speak the same language and have a common mode of life. Additionally, a small portion of Boko Haram's leadership is foreign born or has traveled outside Nigeria for extended periods of time, though a review of the other “foreign elements” within Boko Haram is worth elaborating upon (Pham, 2012). According to Pham (2012), some of the Boko Haram members are from Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin. These are people who speak Hausa as a common language, and they have common ancestors and family lineages. There is a free movement of individuals in the area. Most of the people are held by strong marital bonds.

According to Pham (2012), Boko Haram is also embedded in what international security agencies term the “arc of instability,” spreading across Saharan and Sahelian Africa from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. It is feared that this area of unsafe borders and general ungovernability will become a breeding-ground for Sahel and Sahara-based Salafi-jihadi groups. Due to the proximity of some extremist groups in this region and their similar ideology, it is

feared that their collaboration would result in the ability to launch globally aggressive terrorist attacks (German Marshall Fund, 2012). Adding to this “perfect storm” was the fall of Gaddafi’s Libya, unleashing a catalyzing regional arms trade (U.N Security Council, 2012), and the vacuum of governance in Northern Mali. This is not to mention the low level of economic development, higher incidence of famine, and desertification in many areas of Western Africa that may sway local populations to support radical groups who claim to support their interests.

Human displacement can be both a consequence and a cause of conflict within and among societies. Large numbers of refugees moving across borders have adverse economic impacts on the states where they settle, and may create humanitarian crises and export instability (Dokken, 2008). According to Lohrmann (2000), migration affects international security relations at three levels:

First, it affects the safety agendas of transit and receiving states, as well as of groups within these countries, which may perceive the migration as a threat to the economic welfare, social order, and political stability.

Second, it may affect the bilateral relations between the states as movement often creates tensions and can threaten regional stability.

Third, migration has effects on the “individual security and dignity of refugees and migrants, which may render them, among other things, unpredictable actors in international relations” (Lohrmann, 2000). Mali, Chad, and Sudan had witnessed a series of wars over the decades, and this made people be displaced and moved across borders in the Boko Haram affected the region. Through the movement, some of the refugees having poor socio-economic status could easily be influenced to join the Boko Haram groups (Dokken, 2008).

According to Dokken (2008), mercenaries, militarized refugees, foreign fighters and members of rebel groups and participants in violent conflicts often move from one conflict-ridden region to another, serving various groups and causes. Fighters migrating between conflicts make recruitment of experienced militants easier and are a major cause of regional instability in West Africa. Dokken focuses on mercenaries and militarized refugees, but concerning Boko Haram, it is noteworthy that Islamist insurgencies also attract so-called “foreign fighters”: unpaid non-citizens who have no ties to the conflict except religious affinity with one of the parties. Hegghammer (2010) pointed out that since 1980; between 10,000 and 30,000 such fighters have

inserted themselves into religious conflicts from Bosnia in the West to the Philippines in the East. This case is clear with Boko Haram as Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda rebels can easily migrate from Somalia, Mali and Libya to support the jihadist group in the Lake Chad basin.

The regional proximity of groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) further aggravates the external implications of Boko Haram's activities. Although a well-defined chain between these Sahelian groups and Boko Haram may not be identifiable for now, isolated alliances between them appear to exist (Nossiter, 2013). In November 2011, the Algerian Deputy Foreign Minister cited intelligence reports that indicated ties between Boko Haram and AQIM. In June 2012, this claim was observed by the US' designation of Abubakar Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi and Abubakar Adam Kamar as global terrorists with close links to AQIM. It is considered that Kamar, a native of Borno State, trained together with al-Barnawi in Algeria at an AQIM training camp around 2009, following the major Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria that year. Beyond this, some arrests following counter-insurgency operations by the Nigerian government have revealed an increasing number of Boko Haram-hired mercenaries. Some of these foreign fighters comprise of Cameroonians and Nigerians who through the aid of local Almajiris took part in Boko Haram attacks in Bama region of Borno State. In June 2013, the Nigerian government's Joint Task Force (JTF) arrested a major recruiter for Boko Haram as several militants were reported to have fled from Maiduguri towards the Niger Republic. Olojo (2013), posits that terrains beyond Nigeria's borders also harbor camps where Boko Haram militants have tutored in the past. Quite reasonably, these external dynamics affected Nigeria's military involvement in the Sahel as part of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).

2.1.7 Human Capital Deficits and Transnationalization of Boko Haram

No meaningful analysis can be made of the factors that have facilitated the growth of Boko Haram without considering the educational disparity between the North and the South of Nigeria. This difference could be traced to historical events related to pre-independence and the colonial era. At the time Western education arrived at the shores of Nigeria through the colonial missionaries, Muslims, who were the majority in the North, rejected the content and process of Western education because it was perceived as a tool of evangelism by the Christian missionaries. Muslim Northerners retained the traditional religious schools, popularly referred to as 'Tsangaya,' which were Islamic schools dedicated to the study of Qur'anic education. The South, on the other hand, embraced it wholeheartedly and thus made considerable progress ahead

of the North. It created a gap which remains until today and could be considered responsible for the spread of the Boko Haram ideology (Abdulmalik, et al.; 2009).

Disparities remain between the educational attainments of the indigenes of the two regions. Relative to their share of the national population, the northern zones contribute less than 30% of the young people going to university (National Population Commission (Nigeria) and RTI International, 2011). This is a further attestation to the widespread discrepancies in primary and secondary enrolments between the two regions. Without a primary and secondary education, many of the children in most parts of the North could never advance to attain a university education. In fact, the National Population Commission of Nigeria (2011) found that literacy rates are much lower among states in the North and that 72% of children between the ages of 6 and 16 never attended schools in Borno state, where Boko Haram was founded.

Although some leaders and members of Boko Haram are university graduates and students from influential and affluent backgrounds, the majority of its recruits and followers are unemployed and uneducated youths based on a cell network that ensures adequate training and skills in the use of weapons as well as ideological orientation (Isa, 2010). Without any formal educational system, most of the children fall back on the traditional Islamic school system. Many of these schools lack formal structures and curriculum. Children are sent by parents who want them to acquire an Islamic education from these informal schools. Initially, most of the parents' decisions hinge on their orthodox interpretations of Islam which they believe abhors Western education. This system has long been in place in northern Nigeria but is aggravated by the economic situation that has impacted negatively on many families and pushed them to explore this option rather than a formal education. These children tend to end up on the streets as "almajiris." Almajiri is a corrupt spelling of the Arabic word, al-muhajirin, which describes someone who leaves home in search of knowledge or for the sake of advocating Islamic education. This type of traditional religious education, which is equivalent to the 'Madrassas' of Central Asia, is common in Northern Nigeria. Thus, the term "almajiri" has evolved to mean "street-children" which has become a culture of sorts in northern Nigeria. These children, without any form of parental care, easily fall under the sway of anyone who is willing to provide for them. This is why the "almajiri" children remain a potential target of recruitment and indoctrination for Islamic extremists to promulgate their violent, fanatical ideology. In fact, it has been reported that "almajiri" schools have been used to indoctrinate their students to perceive those who pursue Western education as infidels (Tsafie, 2013). One such school was the

Mohammed Yusuf-founded IbnTaimiyya Mosque in Maiduguri, which is a school of ideology and orientation, as well as a training camp for Boko Haram recruits.

According to Walker (2008), the vulnerable “almajiri” fell into the waiting hands of the sect, lured by handouts that include food, housing, and guidance from the sect’s leadership. Ahmed Salkida, who had close connection with Mohammed Yusuf, held the belief that followers of Boko Haram were numbering up to hundreds of thousands, most of them Almajiris, school dropouts, renegade civil servants and parliamentary staff. While the lack of reliable data and the difficulty of discerning between passive and active support for the group still poses a challenge, as of May 2013, Boko Haram youths were reported to abound still in areas such as Sambisa Games Reserves Forest in Borno State. Although socio-economic deprivation is clearly a dominant variable in the crisis equation in Nigeria, caution must be exercised in the way its predictive value is underscored. This is because there are other intervening variables which must be examined. Therefore, in considering the theoretical relevance of structural violence in a crisis that has a sectarian angle, reducing the Boko Haram crisis to causes such as economic inequality and social marginalization can disguise analysis of the role which other factors play – the most predominant among them being religion.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

From research, experts like Nance (2014), believe that the greatest challenge that the human race has ever faced remains how to live in a world free from the threat of violence. For violence is not restricted to times of war, it exists everywhere, in homes, schools and communities, and where there is injustice remains inevitable. Other experts argue that much of the conflict in the world can be attributed to the existence of an oppressive social system of power that reinforce the difference between groups and allows one group to have power privileged over another group. Besides, conflict at the local and international level in the assessment of security expert, can stem from exploitation, poverty. Corrupting governance, resources scarcity, and dehumanizing belief among other salient causative factors.

2.2.1 The Social Conflict Theory

Karl Marx is the father of social conflict theory. Conflict theory has a long history of sociology. Without question, Karl Marx’s work in the early to mid-1800s formed the initial statements of this perspective. According to Fukuyama (2004), Marx was centrally concerned with class and the dialectics of capitalism. He argued that capitalism would produce its gravediggers by creating

the conditions under which class consciousness and a failing economy would come into existence. In this juncture between structure and class-based group experience, the working class revolution would take place. Social conflict is the struggle between portions of society over valued resources. Due to social conflict, it turned a small community into capitalists in the nineteenth century. Capitalists are people who own and run factories and other businesses in pursuance of profits. However, capitalism turned most people into industrial workers, whom Marx called proletarians. Proletarians are individuals who sell their labor for wages. Conflict theories draw attention to power differentials, such as class, gender, and race conflict, and contrast historically powerful ideologies. It is, therefore, a macro level examination of society that sees society as an arena of imbalance that generates conflict and social change (Fukuyama 2004).

In general, the conflict theory attempts to scientifically justify the general contours of conflict in society how conflict begins and varies, and the outcomes it brings. The central interests of conflict theory are the unequal distribution of scarce resources and power. What these resources are might be different for each theorist, but conflict theorists usually work with Weber's three systems of stratification: class, status, and power. Conflict theorists see power as the central feature of society, rather than thinking of society as held together by collective agreement concerning a cohesive set of cultural standards, as functionalists do. As a result, where power is located and who uses it (and who doesn't) is thus necessary to conflict theory. In this way of reflecting on things, power isn't necessarily evil: it is a primary factor that guides society and social relations.

Coser (2003), argues that conflict is instinctual for humans, so it is found everywhere in human society. There is the conflict of war, but also, there is the conflict that we find in our day to day lives and connections. But Coser also asserts that conflict is different for humans than for other animals in the sense that our conflicts can be goal related. There is something that people are trying to achieve through conflict, and there are different possible ways of reaching the goal. The existence of the possibility of different paths opens up opportunities for negotiation and different types and levels of conflict. Coser (2003), sees conflict as a normal and functional part of human life; he talked about its variation in ways that others missed, such as the level of violence and functional consequences. Coser makes the case for two kinds of functional consequences of conflict: a conflict that occurs within a group and conflict that occurs outside the group. An example of internal conflict is the tension that can exist between indigenous populations or first

nations and the national government. Notice that this internal conflict is actual between or among groups that function within the same social system, this is evident in the case of Boko Haram sect. Examples of external group conflicts are the wars in which a nation may involve itself. When considering the consequences of internal group conflict, Coser is concerned with low-level and more frequent conflict. When explaining the implications of external conflict, he is thinking about more violent conflict.

Coser (2003), also notes that not every internal conflict will be functional. It depends on the types of conflict and social structure that are involved. In Coser's theory, there are two basic types of internal conflict: those that threaten or contradict the fundamental assumptions of the group relationship and those that don't. The group structure will also help determine whether or not a conflict is functional. As Coser (2003), explains, "social structures differ in the way in which they allow expression to antagonistic claims." To talk about this issue, let's make a contrast based on network density. Network density talks of how often a group gets together, the longevity of the group, and the demands of the group regarding personal involvement. Groups whose members frequently interact over long periods of time and have high levels of personal and personality involvement have high network density. Such groups will tend to contain or discourage conflict. If a conflict does erupt in such a group, it will tend to be very intense for two reasons. First, the group will likely have built up unresolved grievances and unreleased hostilities. Once unfettered, these pent-up issues and emotions will tend to push the original conflict over the top. Second, the kind of total personal involvement these groups have makes the mobilization of all emotions that much easier. On the other hand, groups whose members interact less frequently and that demand less involvement-those with low network density will be more likely to experience the functional benefits of conflict. It is so clear that the Boko Haram members are so united, and they often meet to plan and carry out their attacks. Boko Haram operates with their specific ideologies, and they aim at achieving their goals in setting up their Islamic state in the affected area. This, therefore, means they are strongly motivated to achieve their course.

The different groups involved in conflict also experience functional results, especially when the conflict is more violent as in the case of Boko Haram conflict. As a group experiences external conflict, the boundaries surrounding the group become stronger, the members of the group experience greater solidarity, power is exercised more efficiently, and the group tends to form coalitions with other groups (the most violent the conflict is, the more intensified are these

effects). Pérouse de Montclos (2015) points out that Boko Haram sect formed coalitions with members of the Zargina and Konta Konta group arm robbery groups. For any group to exist, it must include some people and exclude others. This inclusion/exclusion process involves producing and regulating different behaviors, ways of feeling and thinking, cultural symbols, and so forth. These differences constitute a group boundary that clearly demarcates those who belong from those who do not.

As a group experiences conflict, the boundaries surrounding the group become stronger and better guarded. Conflict makes this role more robust: “conflict sets boundaries between groups within a social system by strengthening group consciousness and awareness of separateness, thus establishing the identity of groups within the system” (Coser, 2003). Along with stronger external boundaries, conflict enables the group to also experience higher degree of internal solidarity. When a group is involved in conflict, the members will tend to feel a greater sense of camaraderie than during peaceful times. They will see themselves as more alike, more part of the same family, existing for the same reason. Group-specific practices and symbols will be more closely guarded and celebrated. Group rituals will be engaged in more often and with greater fervency, thus producing greater emotional ties between members and creating a sense of sacredness about the group. Pérouse de Montclos (2015) opined that indigenes of the Boko Haram affected area tend to identify themselves and side with the Boko Haram sect as in the case of the Banki and Amchide localities showing that there is a stronger cohesion between the group and the villagers.

Flynn and Donna (1997), contends that it is possible to identify patterns of conflict, cooperation, and competition in social associations called the dyad and the triad. According to Flynn and Donna (1997), the relationship between two parties forms the simplest sociological formation, the dyad. A third party appears in the triad, and thus, the structure of social interactions is fundamentally altered. Simmel states that non-partisan third party may function either as a mediator with the intent of bringing together two disputing parties to produce a harmonious agreement between them, or else function as an arbitrator who balances the disputing parties, contradictory claims against each other and eliminates what is incompatible with those claims. In the case of the Boko Haram the members do not have clear claims as to what they want and as such don't provide an option for negotiation or mediation. Hazen (2007) further identifies two types of interpersonal conflicts regarding whether they involve interests or values. A conflict of interest has its source in the competition. In this case, conflict arises from a situation of scarce

resources as when two parties desire the same thing, but the amount available is not sufficient to satisfy each of them completely and for all time. The interest of the Boko Haram insurgence is to create an Islamic state and to overthrow the central governments and establish their rule and authority in the affected areas as such conflict between the Boko Haram sects and the governments of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger then exist.

Hazen (2007) further pointed out that conflict of values has its source in dissensus. Here, two parties disagree strongly with each other's (religious, moral, ideological, political) beliefs. This, therefore, means that the ideology of the Boko Haram sect of western education is evil and does not tie with the moral and philosophy of modernization and education. Also, Boko Haram sect threatens the political authority of the nations and the world at large. Boko Haram is competing over positions of power and authority needed to propagate their beliefs, as such a conflict of values and interest intermingle to provide a course of their fight. Two ways of resolving the conflict based on competition are through compromise and bargaining. In the case of compromise, the opposing negotiates a give and take exchange in such a way that the gain of one party is not entirely the loss of another. But it is practically impossible to negotiate with the Boko Haram sect because their demands are not clear and also the clear leadership of the sect is not defined. In the case of bargaining, on the other hand, there is essentially no conflict between the parties because they both possess a mutual understanding in that they desire and seek a contractual quid pro quo (from Latin meaning "something for something" exchange). Bargaining is difficult to establish between the states and a terrorist sect like Boko Haram whose objectives and leadership is not clear.

Dahrendorf (1968), recognizes that "continuity is without a doubt one of the fundamental puzzles of social life" but argues that social order is the result of constraint rather than some consensus around social beliefs. In the constraint approach, the norms and values of society are established and imposed through reliable power. In the equilibrium model, the actions of individuals are organized through a collectively held and agreed-upon set of values, roles or types of action, expressive symbols, and so on. According to the views of Dahrendorf (1968) conflict arises as a result of power struggle between conflicting groups. This, therefore, means that Boko Haram sects want its authority to be established, and it values, roles or norms established within the affected area. The Boko Haram sect through violent conflict wants to exercise its authority within organized, structured countries. The sect's ideology is, therefore, a threat to the central governments of the Lake Chad Basin governments.

When applying the social conflict theory to the case of Boko Haram, it is important to note that the sect's interest is to create an Islamic state and to overthrow the central governments and establish their rule and authority in the affected areas. This interest emanates from grievances accumulated as a result of unequal distribution of resources in the country and as such conflict between the Boko Haram sects and the governments of Nigeria then exist, spreading to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

2.2.2 Frustration-Aggression Theory

John Dollard and his research associates developed the frustration-Aggression Theory and it has been expanded and modified by scholars like Leonard Berkartz (1862) and Aubery Yates (1962) and appears to be the most common explanation for violent behavior as a result of an inability to fulfill needs which in turn affect the security of some nation. This has been the case of the Boko Haram sect whose militant activities was born out of frustration and aggression on the part of the policy matter and implementers of the northern region who for long have been aggrieved, perhaps from lack of government attention. Another explanation that frustration-aggression theory provide is that aggression is not just undertaken as a natural reaction or instinct, but this is the outcome of frustration in a situation where the legitimate desires of an individual are refused either directly or by the indirect outcomes of the way the society is structured. For example, Mohammed Yusuf the Boko Haram leaders' desired for the implementation of Sharia as state policy in Borno state, agitated the inadequacies in its implementation and reaction to certain issues which were not well controlled by the authorities. People will always rally behind any body or group that hold brief against the government regarding social injustice and oppression, but there are consequences as this expression of aggression bring threat and fear on the citizens.

When applying Frustration-Aggression theoretical framework about Boko Haram terrorism, it is of importance to take into consideration the high rates of poverty. In this case, we will be looking at the incidence of poverty in Northern Nigeria and Northern Cameroon (Far North Region). It is true that poverty rates are high in both countries. In Nigeria, 61% live on less than One Dollar a day in 2010 according to NBS (2012) while Cameroon had around 39.9 percent in 2010 according to a report of IMF (2014). Poverty in Northern Nigeria was average around 66.4 percent in 2010 (Aiyedogbon and Ohwofasa, cited in National Bureau of Statistics, 2012) whereas the Far North Region of Cameroon had a poverty rate at 65.9 percent in 2014 (Cameroon web, 2014). , when citizens find themselves with dire socio-economic difficulties and corrupt elites, they often turn to religious or radical extremist groups as is the case in Syria where

the ISIS is fast becoming a national, regional and even international threat. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the above explanations do not aim to make Boko Haram appear as blameless. Rather, it aims to expose the fact that Boko Haram terrorism is a symptom of some major concerns affecting Northern Nigeria and Northern Cameroon.

2.2.3 Relative Deprivation Theory

Ted Robert Gurr postulated the relative deprivation theory, which explains political conflicts or violence as a result of a difference in the social, political, and economic situation of the individual. This theory dates back to Aristotle's theory of revolution. In his book titled "Why Men Rebel," he tried to establish a connection between political violence and the feelings of deprivation that resulted from individuals unfulfilled expectations. It states that when individuals feel they are deprived, this will lead to anger and frustration, frustration leads to aggression, violence and rebellion. Gurr's concept proposes some intervening devices such as "dissident institutional support" and "regime institutional support", but the crux of his approach is still rooted in frustration and aggression (Hafez 2003). This theory applies to the Boko Haram situation in that the group members felt deprived of the resources that other parts of the country were enjoying. The northerners agitated against such injustice, but the Nigerian government responded by using the military to quench the uprising. This action left the northerners frustrated and as a result, Boko Haram sprang up.

2.2.4 Collective Security Approach

The basic idea is that a peaceful arrangement can exist among nations if each accepts that the security of one is the concern of all. Collective security also, to some extent, sees national security as a side benefit of world order to be managed by some transcendent authority from above. It is the theoretical foundation upon which the League of Nations and the United Nations were built. It is necessary to note that the United Nations is only an example of collective security, not the embodiment of it. It rejects the notion that alliances and neutrality can work, and substitutes the idea that "an attack against one is an attack against all." The basic idea is to relieve nations from the burden of having to provide national security by themselves because weaker nations cannot possibly defend themselves, and stronger nations often become involved in never-ending arms races which usually detract from their security over the long term. It tries to encourage cooperation and peaceful change, and as such, is a peace theory that can be

distinguished from the notion of "collective defense" which it is often confused with. (Hafez, 2003).

In this light, a Multinational Joint Task Force led by Maj. Gen. Iliya Abbah has been created to fight Boko Haram in the four countries in which it operates-Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.

Lack of state capacity is increasingly seen among politicians and scholars as a major international security challenge. For instance, Francis Fukuyama (2005) argues that “weak or failed states are the source of many of the world’s most serious problems, from poverty to AIDS to terrorism and drugs.” However, there is no relationship between the degree of state failure and violence. In the case of terrorism, weak states can, in fact, provide more beneficial environments than collapsed states. Collapsed states present clan conflicts, logistical constraints, and risk of Western military intervention, which make setting up a presence difficult for terrorist movements. On the other hand, weak states provide “relative stability and basic infrastructure, (Burk, 2002). This enables terrorist movements to take advantage of improved logistics and infrastructure, while simultaneously hiding both from the weak central government and the international community (Hegghammer, 2010). This illustrates that the characteristics of a state have implications not only for which theoretical perspective is most suitable for studying its security politics, but also for the extent and forms of violence likely to emerge in the state and the impact in the region or bordering country.

2.3 Gaps Identified in the Literature Review

1) A lot of research has been carried out on the region’s long and shifting borders and how they allow Boko Haram to escape capture, evade and develop havens where they can plan attacks and recruit new members. However, little has been done to show that these long and porous borders are a contributing factor to the spread of Boko Haram to other countries which is what this study sets out to investigate. The 2,000-mile border Nigeria shares with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon have almost 1,500 illegal or unmonitored crossing routes. Also, the geography of ignorance and deprivation has not yet been investigated and established as one of the factors for the spread of Boko Haram. The issue of education has been ignored on the basis that everyone can have access to education now forgetting that in those remote areas, people don’t even have means to livelihood talk less of means to foster education. Boko Haram has exploited this weakness to

their advantage by indoctrinating the youths with their ideology and subsequently recruiting them.

2) Most researchers hold that Chad's military has been relatively effective at preventing incursions by Boko Haram, but Niger, Cameroon, and Nigeria are suffering from poor communications and a lack of patrol vehicles, equipment, training, and motivation to counter Boko Haram activities. This study, therefore, sets out to investigate if these poor communication and cooperation are contributing factors to Boko Haram's transnationalization since much research has not yet been carried out on that line of study.

3) Boko Haram has strong ethnolinguistic cross-border ties. The linguistic, and cultural ties to the region, particularly the Sunni Muslim cohesion of Kanuri, Hausa, and Shuwa Arab groups that transcend national boundaries facilitates cross-border movement and makes policing the area tough. Boko Haram takes advantage of this, entering the borders along with the regular inflow of refugees and people taking part in cross-border trade. Authorities have difficulty differentiating Boko Haram members from other citizens and as a result, this study will be investigating if this has enabled the sect members to extend their attacks to Nigeria's neighboring countries.

What stands out in the activities of Boko Haram in this region suggests the group's objective to create a caliphate. This is so because the area where the activities have been concentrated in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon is a heterogeneous society that constitutes elements of the defined caliphate of Kanem Bornu. Kanem Bornu was made up of North East Nigeria North Cameroon, South West Chad and South East Niger, the Lake Chad basin.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

3.1.1 Study Approach

The study was cross-sectional and at the beginning of the field work, a permission letter was obtained from school that granted access to interviewees. On sampling days, the purpose and benefits of the study were well explained to the study participant at their respective locations before they gave their concern. Participants were only those who were available and willing to be part of the study and participation was entirely voluntary, and investigation in the study included oral interviews. Also, descriptive research design was employed; retrospective study design was also employed because the emergence of terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin has a historical background which stems from Nigeria. Contemporary historical studies (and secondary sources) were also used to explain the cooperation and collaboration of inter-agencies in a relationship with cross-border security.

3.1.2 Study Period and Target Population

The study was carried out between the months of November – December 2015. The targeted population was police commissioner, military persons who have been to the battlefield, selected civil society organization, selected university lecturer and selected trader.

3.1.3 Sampling Strategy

The availability sampling strategy was employed to choose the individual respondents. This technique was based on the availability and willingness of the respondents to take part in the research. The first respondents were identified by looking at the authors of the literature and news articles on Boko Haram, as well as the websites of relevant institutions, such as ECOWAS. The Nigerian consulate here in Buea also provided me with useful contacts, and I tried making appointments as early as possible.

I sent potential respondents (NGO Leaders and University Lecturers) an e-mail with information about my project and asked for 45-60 minutes interviews, but it was difficult to get replies and to set firm dates for the meetings. However, I followed up with phone calls and got appointments with most of the people I had contacted.

I also used the snowball method, asking the first respondents to identify other possible respondents. A problem with using the snowball method is that the selection of respondents may be biased because the respondents refer to others with the same background and views as

themselves (Tansey, 2007). I tried to avoid this by taking more than one respondent as my starting-point, and ensuring that they came from various institutions and organization.

3.2 Data Collection

The study made use of both primary and secondary data. Key informant interviews were conducted using an interview guide. Demographic and Socio – economic data was obtained using the availability sampling technique. A total of 30 key informant interviews were conducted with military personnel, a police commissioner, university lecturer, NGO leaders, and traders. All interviews were written down.

Secondary data were obtained through desktop review of relevant books, peer-reviewed journal articles, published and unpublished thesis, magazine articles, websites publications and news channels. Due to the nature of the study, more of secondary sources and data than primary sources were employed. The study made use of materials from Amnesty International and Human Right Watch, to analyze the issue of human rights abuse in the Boko Haram affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin. Also, materials from UNDP and National Bureau of Statistics were used to investigate the economic disparities existing in the affected regions of the four countries involved. Articles from news channels such BBC, CNN and Aljazeera were also used to know the degree to which Boko Haram has spread and its effects in the affected countries. Literature was also gathered from reports from the presidency of the Republic of Cameroon (2015) to evaluate the level of cooperation between Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger and Chad towards counter-terrorism effort.

3.3 Analytical Approach

The data obtained were entered into a spreadsheet using Microsoft Excel. Descriptive statistics (frequency, percentage) was used to analyze data collected from the interviews. The data was analyzed using Microsoft Excel. Charts and tables were used to enhance explanation. The charts and tables were developed using Microsoft Excel 2007 software.

3.4 Validation of Results

The validity of the results was ensured using two measures: firstly the reliability of the data collection instrument was pre-tested and necessary corrective measures taken. Some questions were added, some rephrased to enhance comprehension while the others were discarded entirely.

Secondly, the trustworthiness of the key informant responses was ensured through cross reference questions.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

This section provides a descriptive presentation of findings on transnationalization of terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin: The Boko Haram enigma. Results are presented in the order of interview following the objectives. This is based on demographic characteristics of respondents; the socio – cultural similarities of the peoples of the Lake Chad Basin region that promoted the spread of Boko Haram; the level cooperation among the affected countries and counter-terrorism efforts; geographic enablers of Boko Haram sects and the human capital deficits and transnationalization of Boko Haram.

4.1 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

The demographic characteristics of respondents consist of gender, age, and marital status, a level of education, occupation and longevity of service in the occupation.

Sex

The findings presented here are based on respondents' sex.

Table 2: Distribution of Respondents to sex

Sex	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Male	22	73.3
Female	08	26.7
Total	30	100

From Table 2 above, a majority of the respondents were males (73.3%) and some females (26.7%). Most of the respondents were males because most of the interviewees recruited for the study were in the military and police serving in the Extreme North of Cameroon.

Age group

The findings presented are based on the age group distribution of respondents in the study.

Table 3: Distribution of respondents with respect to age group

Age group	(n)	(%)
21 – 30	12	40.0
31 – 40	10	33.3
41 – 50	08	26.7
Total	30	100

From Table 3, most (40.0%) of the respondents were between the age group 21 – 30 years. Some (33.3%) of the respondents were in the age bracket of 31 – 40 years while 26.7% of the respondents were in the age bracket of 41 – 50 years.

Marital status

The findings presented here are based on the marital status of the respondents in the study.

Table 4: Distribution of respondents with respect to marital status

Marital status	(n)	(%)
Single	12	40.0
Married	18	60.0
Total	30	100

From Table 4 above, a majority (60.0%) of the respondents were married while some (40.0%) of the respondents were single.

Level of education


Table 5: Distribution of respondents with respect to level of education

Level of education	(n)	(%)
Primary school	02	06.7
Secondary school	10	33.3
Advanced level	06	20.0
University degree	06	20.0
Masters degree	04	13.3
Ph.D	02	06.7
Total	30	100

From Table 5 above, most of the respondents were secondary school leavers (33.3%), some were advanced level holders (20.0%) and university degree holders (20.0%). Few (13.3%) of the respondents were masters degree holders while very few respondents were primary school leavers (06.7%) and 1 Philosophy Degree (Ph.D.) holder (06.7%). The findings show that all the respondents are educated and hold at least a first school leaving certificate. That is at least 93.3% of the respondents have at least a secondary school leaving certificate.

Occupation of respondents

The findings presented here are based on the respondents' occupation. Most of the interviewees chosen were those in the arm forces and police because of their active involvement in the fight against Boko Haram.



1=Police officer, 2=Military officers, 3=NGO leaders, 4=Diplomats, 5= University lecturers, 6= Trader

Figure 3: Distribution of respondents on occupation

From figure 3 above, a majority (33.4%) of the respondents were military officers; some were police officers (20.0%), diplomats (13.3%); NGO leaders (13.3%); traders (13.3%) and very few (06.7%) were university lecturers.

Longevity of service

The findings here are based on the length of time respondents have occupied the position they occupy.

Table 6: Distribution of respondents to longevity of service

Longevity of service	(n)	(%)
1 – 5 years	20	66.7
6 – 9 years	08	26.6
Above 10 years	02	06.7
Total	30	100


Source: Field work November 2015

From Table 5, a majority (66.7%) of the respondents have been working for 1 to 5 years. Some (26.6%) 6 – 9 years and 1 (06.7%) of the respondents has worked for more than a decade.

4.2 Presentation of Findings

The findings showed here are based on the research questions of the study. The research questions include: What socio-cultural factors support the transnationalization of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin area? How has the level of cooperation of the Lake Chad Basin countries affected the success of counter-terrorism effort in the area? How have the vast ungoverned areas linking the Lake Chad area to the Sahel region contributed to a growth of Boko Haram? How has the level of human capital development of people in the area affected the counter-terrorism war?

4.2.1 What socio-cultural factors support the transnationalization of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin area?



1= Language, 2= Cultural belief, 3= Religion, 4=Manner of dressing

Figure 4: Distribution of cultural aspects that influence the spread of the Boko Haram

From figure 4 above, all the respondents responded that the cultural aspects that influenced the spread of Boko Haram were language and religion and some of the respondents' respondent that cultural beliefs (66.7%) and manner of dressing (80%) also influenced the spread of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin region. This is because most of the people of the area share a common religion which is Islam, they have a common language they speak Hausa, and they were all part of the great Kanuri kingdom. Still, respondents further pointed out that language and religion influenced the spread of Boko Haram in the region to a greater extent while cultural beliefs and manner of dressing influenced the spread of Boko Haram to a lesser extent.

The findings indicate that many local community members would easily identify themselves with the Boko Haram sect members or leaders as they view the sect members as their community members and relatives rather than collaborating with the central governments. Through this, many local people are quickly recruited to be part of the Boko Haram sect as they speak the same language, have the same cultural belief system and practice the same religion. It is commonly said charity and solidarity begin at home. A stranger to the community members is not trusted as a person who speaks and has the same belief system with him. Consequently, in an interview with military personnel, he pointed out that “community members do not understand French or English, and when one speaks to them they don’t reply, but when addressed by a local person in the local language they respond with ease.”

Based on these findings it is, therefore, clear that the socio-cultural factors have helped to spread the Boko Haram activities in the four affected countries. The local people speaking and understanding a common language, dressing in a similar manner, having similar cultural beliefs and sharing a common religious belief which is Islam is evidence that socio – cultural ties have helped spread Boko Haram activities.

4.2.2 How has the level of cooperation of the Lake Chad Basin countries affected the success of counter-terrorism effort in the area?

All the respondents pointed out that there are military cooperation, state cooperation, community and individual collaboration between the four affected countries that is Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad, and Niger.

Table 7: Distribution of respondents’ to cooperation type and the extent of cooperation

Type of cooperation	Level of cooperation				Total	
	Weak		Strong		N	%
	N	%	n	%		
Military cooperation	00	00.0	30	100	30	100
State cooperation	00	00.0	30	100	30	100
Community cooperation	24	80.0	06	20.0	30	100
individual cooperation	12	40.0	18	60.0	30	100
African Union/United Nations	08	26.7	22	73.3	30	100

From Table 6 above, all the respondents averred that there is a strong military and states cooperation to fight Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin area by the affected countries. Still, a majority (80%) of respondents pointed out that the community cooperation is weak while some (20%) of respondents responded that there is a strong community cooperation. More by individual cooperation to fight Boko Haram, a majority (60%) of respondents pointed out that there is strong individual cooperation while some (40%) of the population indicated that it is weak. Moreover, a majority (73.3%) of respondents pointed out that there is a strong African Union/United Nations cooperation to fight Boko Haram while some (26.7%) said that there is weak cooperation between the African Union/United Nations for the fight against Boko Haram. Based on the statistics majority (70.7%) of respondents agreed that there was a strong cooperation by the military, states affected, community, personnel and the African Union/United Nations to fight Boko Haram while some (29.3%) said there was weak cooperation.

To further buttress the extent of cooperation to fight Boko Haram based on interviews with the respondents, they reported that at the beginning of the crises there was a weak cooperation by the states, the military and communities to fight the Boko Haram insurgencies. The university lecturer pointed out that “the state cooperation only intensified after the Paris conference to fight Boko Haram and the revamp of the Lake Chad Basin Commission further improved interstate cooperation.”

Based on an interview with another military personnel, he pointed out that “There is little cooperation between the affected states military coordination to fight Boko Haram before 2014...”

The weak military cooperation and state cooperation at the beginning gave enough room for the Boko Haram insurgencies to continue their activities within the communities.

When respondents were asked to propose measures which could help to strengthen cooperation between the affected countries, all of the respondents interviewed suggested that through the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the multinational Joint Task Force should be empowered. A standing budget should be voted to equip the military and to pay the soldiers involved to fight the Boko Haram insurgencies. Still, respondents proposed that the fight against Boko Haram should not only be based on a military fight but negotiations with the terrorists. More so, some of the respondents proposed that there should be a strong collaboration/cooperation between local communities and the military. Furthermore, the respondents proposed that the military people

involved in the fight against Boko Haram should be paid in all the countries. The journalist pointed out that "... in Nigeria and in Cameroon especially, the military people face problems of corruption as money meant for them does not get to them at all..."

Based on the question of recommendations to help fight Boko Haram, a majority of the respondents responded that the Lake Chad Basin Commission should be strengthened, and it should collaborate with the ECOWAS and ECCAS to fight against the Boko Haram insurgency. Still, the respondents recommended that a good military strategy should be devised to carry out attacks on the Boko Haram hideout on all fronts from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger such that the cult members would not escape into any of the countries. More still, respondents recommended that community members should be educated on the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency such that they can collaborate with the military rather than being attacked by the military. Furthermore, respondents recommended that the basic amenities should be provided to the local communities and roads tarred in the respective areas such that the local community members would feel integrated into the states. This is because the areas where the Boko Haram activities are rampant are underdeveloped, and most of the people live below the poverty line and can easily be manipulated to join the Boko Haram insurgencies for any pay. This was pointed out by an NGO leader who said "... the living standards of the local people in the Boko Haram affected areas are deplorable, and they can turn to the terrorists for any promises made or any amount of money paid to recruit them."

4.2.3. How have the vast ungoverned areas linking the Lake Chad area to the Sahel region contributed to the growth of Boko Haram?

All the respondents reported as they were asked that the long uncontrolled borders linking the four affected countries have contributed to the spread of the conflict in the region. Still, respondents were asked to propose how the uncontrolled border affected the spread of Boko Haram. All the respondents reported that there was free movement of people and small weapons in and out of the affected area. More still, the inhabitants of the area have relatives in all the countries as they get married and have family relations in all the affected areas. The free movement of people in the area has helped in trade within the communities in both legal and illegal goods like weapons. One military officer pointed out that "... the circulation of people in the Boko Haram affected area with porous borders helped with the movement of weapons used by the terrorists to fight."

When respondents were asked if the Chad pipeline was one of the uncontrolled borders, most (60%) of the respondents accepted. Some stated that before, there was free movement along the Chad-Cameroon pipeline and with the rise of the insurgency Boko Haram the Pipeline is now protected since the terrorists can bomb or destroy it at any given time, while some (40%) of the respondents reported that the Chad-Cameroon pipeline was always controlled. Respondents further said that the types of goods transported through the Chad pipeline included arms and light weapons, food, bombs and drugs. The majority (90%) of respondents reported that arms and light weapons, bombs and drugs transported through the porous borders have influenced the spread of Boko Haram to a greater extent in the affected area, while some (10%) of respondents reported that it has influenced the spread of Boko Haram to a lesser extent.

Respondents were further asked on the type of activities carried out in the uncontrolled borders. Most of the respondents reported the kidnapping, transportation of illegal goods, stealing, and killing of local people.




Figure 5: Distribution of respondent's opinions to activities in the ungoverned borders

In Figure 3 above, respondents outlined that the events which take place in the ungoverned border are the transportation of illegal weapons (28%), killing of innocent people (26%), stealing (24%) and kidnapping (22%). This shows that the Boko Haram insurgency benefits from the uncontrolled border to carry out their criminal activities. Although a military captain further pointed out that "...the illegal activities were rampant on the frontier when the military cooperation between the states did not exist."

It should be considered that as of the time this research was carried out, the military and state cooperation had further strengthened the border control in the Boko Haram affected area. Though, the insurgency had developed a strategy of recruiting and using children and women as suicide bombers.


Still, the respondents further asserted that the activities that took place in the uncontrolled border promoted the spread of Boko Haram as weapons were smuggled from countries which just collapsed like Mali, Sudan, Somalia and Libya into the Lake Chad Basin countries. In the words of the University lecturer “...the Lake Chad Basin areas affected by the Boko Haram crisis have porous borders and closer to the arc of instability stretching across Saharan and Sahelian Africa from the Atlantic to the Indian ocean.” Furthermore, an NGO leader pointed out that “... the many wars fought in Sudan, Mali, Central African Republic, and Libya have facilitated the movement of refugees into the affected Boko Haram area “...this refugees are vulnerable and can do anything to earn a living – even as recruits for Boko Haram.”

Still on ungoverned and uncontrolled borders, a Nigerian Diplomat said; “...large numbers of refugees moving across borders have created humanitarian crises and instability has increased within the affected countries...militarized refugees move from one conflict area to another fighting in this case for religious affinity close ties with between AlQaeda and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad (MUJAO) groups and Boko Haram has facilitated the spread of the insurgency in the area.”

This, therefore, means that unsecured and ungoverned porous borders has promoted Boko Haram transnationalization as illegal goods, firearms, refugees and militarized terrorists’ group fighters’ move across the porous borders. Unless governments of the area consider the “arc of instability” and strengthen the borders, the fight against Boko Haram insurgency would not end easily as many fighters and vulnerable refugees would be recruited to fight for the Boko Haram sect.

4.2.4 How has the level of human capital development of people in the area affected the counter-terrorism war?

Respondents stated that the following factors have contributed to the spread of Boko Haram in the area: high illiteracy rate in the locality; poor educational infrastructures; high rate of street children (Almajiris) and poverty.



1=High illiteracy rate, 2= poor educational infrastructure, 3= High rate of street children, 4= High poverty rate

Figure 6: Distribution of respondents to human capital factors that affect the spread of Boko Haram

Based on the findings all the respondents reported that there is a high rate of illiteracy and a high rate of street children (the almajiris) in the area. The illiteracy rate in the area as pointed out by one of the respondents was as a result of the rejection of western education by the local communities since they thought western education was a tool of Christian evangelism. More so, the lecturer said (parents preferred to educate their children in traditional mosque and the Quranic doctrine rather than in formal schools.” Still, there are many street children who have dropped out of formal school, and some have refused to school since their parents do not encourage them to school. Again, most respondents reported that they are also poor educational infrastructures (93.3%) and a high poverty rate (86.7%) in the Boko Haram affected area. To further buttress this, an NGO leader pointed out that “the people have just turned against the central governments as a result of poor educational infrastructural development and high poverty rate which has frustrated them.”

Respondents were asked to explain how the factors had contributed to the spread of the Boko Haram sect. Respondent’s responses to high illiteracy rate were that poor decisions are made by the uneducated people, and they are easily manipulated by the sect members to join in the Boko Haram insurgency. Through this, there is an increase in the number of Boko Haram fighters due

to easy influence of the group members. A police officer pointed out that “ an uneducated person is easily manipulated by the sect members to join than an educated person, the illiterate local people are manipulated by the sect members to think they are fighting a just course for their rights.” These clearly show that little knowledge about the objectives or activities of the sect is known by the people as they are manipulated to join as members.

All the respondents also averred that the high rate of street children has contributed to the spread of Boko Haram as the street children are manipulated by the cult members for little allowances to become cult members. The university lecturer said “... Street children who are looking for a means to survive are employed for low wages like food and 5000 FCFA as pay every month to be sect members.”

The presence of many street children has therefore promoted the spread of the Boko Haram sect as the children serve as a source of new recruits for the Boko Haram sect. Also, recently, most of the suicides bombing attacks were carried out by children below the age of 18 years in both Nigeria and Cameroon.

The respondents further explained that little educational infrastructures and other infrastructural development in the affected area have promoted the spread of Boko Haram insurgency. Respondents pointed out that in the affected area irrespective of the country there are few schools constructed, and the schools do not have benches and also lacked teachers to teach. The university lecturer said, “...if the schools were well constructed and teachers posted or recruited there with good learning facilities the children would stay in school rather than be in the streets.” From the response, it, therefore, means that the states failed in educating their citizens who are now being manipulated to join the sect in its illegal activities. This is evident as the message of fighting for the right of the people is easily adopted by the uneducated local people.

Lastly, the high poverty rate reported by the respondents has influenced the spread of Boko Haram in the area because most of the people are poor, and they live below the poverty line. This enables them to accept little pay for any tasks or mission they are engaged into. A military officer said, “...poverty as a result of lack of basic skills and job opportunities in the affected community has made the local people join Boko Haram in exchange for little pay.” The fight against Boko Haram is difficult and would still be difficult because the local people identify themselves with the sect members due to grievances they have with the central governments of the affected countries involved. Poverty being a major grievance as pointed out by one of the

respondents who is an NGO leader “... the local people have become brainwashed to think they are fighting because they have been forgotten by the central governments and has left them poor.” To this effect, poor educational infrastructures, high rate of uneducated street children, poverty as a result of high rate of illiteracy has contributed to the transnationalization of Boko Haram.

4.3 Discussion of Findings

The findings are discussed here based on the research questions in line with the literature review. The findings would be based on socio-cultural affinity factors that lead to the spread of Boko Haram; the cross-border cooperation of the Lake Chad area countries in fighting the sect; the vast unsecured and ungoverned borders and the human capital deficits and the transnationalization of Boko Haram.

4.3.1 The socio-cultural factors that lead to the spread of Boko Haram

The socio-cultural factors that have helped to spread the Boko Haram activities from Nigeria to Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, are language as the local people speak and understand a common language, dress in a similar manner, have similar cultural beliefs and most of them share a common religious belief which is Islam. The findings are in line with Egwu (2001) who pointed out that the term ethnoreligious identity was coined to capture the tendency for the boundary between ethnicity and religion to coalesce during moments of conflict and violence. Still, the findings are in line with the findings of Olojo (2013) who pointed out that an important historical detail that also fed into the contemporary dynamics of support for Boko Haram’s rise and insurgency was British colonisation, the present region of north-eastern Nigeria was a colony under the sovereign government of the Bornu Empire, composed of a majority of Kanuri-Muslims. More still, the findings revealed that religion is a major factor which promotes the spread of Boko Haram in line with the findings of Paden (2008) which showed that the intensity of religious identity in Nigeria is regarded as one of the highest in the world. This is additionally confirmed by the findings of Gomez (2010) which showed that Nigeria’s Muslims say they don’t trust people of other religions at all. The findings are further supported by Walker (2012) who pointed out that Boko Haram sect started as a humanitarian group and to consolidate its sense of community and humanitarian purpose the group was established around the mosque, with a cabinet, its religious police, and a large farm. The sense of organization and community led the group to focus on recruiting new members and assembling resources (Militant Leadership

Monitor 2012). This, therefore, means that ethnic identity, religious identity of the Kanuri, Fulani, Hausa people in the affected region has contributed to the spread of Boko Haram within the affected region since the Boko Haram insurgence is of similar ethnic background with same language, cultural practices, and Islamic religious affiliation.

4.3.2 Cooperation with the Lake Chad area countries in fighting the sect

The findings revealed that majority (70.7%) of respondents agreed that there exist a strong military cooperation, states cooperation, community cooperation, personnel cooperation and the African Union/United Nations cooperation to fight Boko Haram while some (29.3%) of respondents said there is still a weak cooperation as of the research time. Although the respondents pointed out that at the beginning of the crises, there was a weak cooperation between the militaries involved, the Lake Chad Basin states and community cooperation. But gradually the cooperation between the four countries has grown strong because of the renewal of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. The findings are also in line with the report from the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon (2015) on the fight against Boko Haram, based on cooperation of the Heads of State of Benin, Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger and Chad to fight against Boko Haram. Still, the military cooperation has improved since the formation of the Multilateral Joint Task Force (MJTF) and after the Paris conference the fight against Boko Haram insurgents has improved (Pérouse de Montclos, 2015).

The weak cooperation between the states, military and community members is still in line with Pérouse de Montclos (2015) who pointed out weaknesses of state cooperation and military cooperation in early January 2015 as insurgents took over the Baga military barracks, which housed the MJTF command. This event further highlighted the inability of the region's armies to contain Boko Haram. Since then, Chad has deployed troops in Niger and Cameroon, hinting at the possibility of a greater military involvement of the French-speaking countries. It also managed to get the MJTF command transferred from Baga to Ndjamena.

Also, community cooperation with the respective governments is weak, and it is in line with Pérouse de Montclos (2015) who stated that pressure from the Nigerian and Cameroonian armies has not been effective, and the military has damaged relations with parts of the population in Borno which has tended to support the sect. Given that the potential of military response is limited other options must be considered, such as humanitarian aid or the reinforcement of basic public services to legitimize the weakest states or the negotiation of sanctuary or amnesty for the

rebels. This would intern improve cooperation between the local community and the government and it would reduce the sects influence on the community members.

4.3.3 The vast unsecured and ungoverned borders and its impacts on Boko Haram activities

The findings revealed that the vast unsecured and ungoverned borders have promoted Boko Haram transnationalization as illegal goods, firearms, refugees and militarized terrorists' group fighters' move across the porous borders. The findings are in line with Pham (2012) who reported that some of the Boko Haram members are from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin. The Boko Haram affected area consist of people who speak Hausa as a common language, and they have common ancestors and family lineages, and there is a free movement of people in the area, and most of the people are held by strong marital bonds. The findings are also supported by Pham (2012) who revealed that Boko Haram is also embedded in what international security agencies term the "arc of instability," stretching across Saharan and Sahelian Africa from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. The findings of Dokken (2008) support the findings of this study which showed that mercenaries, militarized refugees, foreign fighters and members of rebel groups and participants in violent conflicts often move from one conflict-ridden region to another, serving various groups and causes. As such fighters migrating between conflicts, make recruitment of experienced militants easier, and are a major cause of regional instability in West Africa. Dokken (2008) focused on mercenaries and militarized refuges, but in relation to Boko Haram, it is noteworthy that Islamist insurgencies also attract so-called "foreign fighters": unpaid non-citizens who have no ties to the conflict except religious affinity with one of the parties. The findings of this study have revealed that when borders are porous and ungoverned there is always a free movement of people, all sorts of illegal goods and weapons which can be used to destabilise states.

4.3.4 The human capital deficits and the transnationalization of Boko Haram

The findings revealed that the Boko Haram insurgent has spread in the area as a result of high illiteracy rate in the locality; poor educational infrastructures; high rate of street children (Almajiris) and poverty. The high illiteracy rate and a high rate of street children are as a result of the people resisting western education because they thought it was a form of Christian evangelism. As such they preferred to educate their children in traditional Islamic schools. The findings of this study are in line with the findings of Abdulmalik, Omigbodun, Beida, and

Adedokun (2009) who revealed that at the time Western education arrived at the shores of Nigeria through the colonial missionaries, Muslims, who were the majority in the North, rejected the content and process of Western education because it was perceived as a tool of evangelism by the Christian missionaries. Muslim Northerners retained the traditional religious schools, popularly referred to as ‘Tsangaya,’ which were Islamic schools dedicated to the study of Qur’anic education. The South, on the other hand, embraced it wholeheartedly and thus made considerable progress ahead of the North. It created a gap which remains until today and could be considered responsible for the spread of the Boko Haram ideology among the uneducated Muslims.

Still, street children are easily manipulated by the sect members to join the group and the findings are similar to the results of the National Population Commission of Nigeria (2011) which found that literacy rates are much lower among states in the North, and that 72% of children between the ages of 6 and 16 never attended schools in Borno state, where Boko Haram was founded. The findings revealed are similar to the World Bank (2012) report on Cameroon’s secondary and primary educational systems which revealed that in 2009 about 3.4 million children were enrolled in primary school compared to 2 million in 1991 whereas at secondary school levels about 1.3 million were enrolled which had double compared to enrolment in 1991. The report further revealed that the Northern Regions of Cameroon had low rates of literacy. The World Bank (2012) findings revealed that more 60% of children between the ages of 6 and 17 in the three Northern Regions of Cameroon have never gone to school and cannot read or write.

Furthermore, the findings are similar to the findings of Tsafe (2013) who revealed that “almajiri” schools have been used to indoctrinate their students to perceive those who pursue Western education as infidels. Nevertheless, these make children and youths vulnerable and disadvantaged in life opportunities and can easily be manipulated to join any insurgent group for little wages or benefits. The findings are similar to those of Isa (2010) which revealed that majority of Boko Haram recruits and followers are unemployed and uneducated youths based on a cell network that ensures adequate training and skills in the use of weapons as well as ideological orientation. The findings are in line with the frustration-aggression theory which explains that violence is as a result of frustration of lack of basic needs. As such poverty is the precursor of aggression and an argument which is used to recruit local people to join the Boko Haram sect. The findings have revealed that human capital deficits has promoted the spread of the Boko Haram insurgency in the affected area as a result of high illiteracy rate, poverty, little

educational infrastructures which has lead to the prevalence of street children and youth who are easily manipulated to join the sect for little pay or wages.

4.4 Limitations of the study

The result of the study is firstly to the socio-cultural factors of the people of the Boko Haram affected area. The findings revealed that religion, language and cultural beliefs influenced the spread of the Boko Haram in the region. The scope of the study could further be exploited to the aspects of religion and language which promotes violence. That is further investigation could still be carried out to know if there are aspects of language and religion of the people which promotes violence and aggression.

Also, the results of the study revealed that they borders of the countries affected with Boko Haram sect are porous and ungoverned. The scope of the study could be treated on the fact that Boko Haram members might be sponsored by the central government as a form of political instability to bring down the existing political institutions. As such the finding would shift from porous ungoverned borders to the crises being one of frustration of people with existing political regimes.

Lastly, the results of the study have revealed human capital deficits in the domain of little educational infrastructures, poverty, high illiteracy rates in the Boko Haram affected region as a result of the indigenous people resisting western education. The scope of the study could still be treated as the unwillingness of political institutions to provide the basic services to the people of the region. This is because if there is a political will to educate and promote human capital development by the states the citizens would see the importance and succumb to development as they are involved in the planning. Therefore the findings revealed in this study are only limited to the objectives and the research questions set out to be investigated by the researcher. Taking into consideration, the limitations pointed out, the results of this study are limited to the research objectives. Other aspects may be considered.

5.5 Limitations of the study

As the case with any research work, readers need to consider the presented outcomes within the context of limitations. The inability to have real and first-hand information and elicitation with current or even former members of Boko Haram sect, especially, as the Boko Haram terrorist activities is still on-going, and the inability to access the affected areas to also get firsthand

information from the victims of Boko Haram attacks were the two most important limitation of the study.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of findings

The summary of the findings presented here would be based on the results of research objectives. Firstly, the study revealed that the socio-cultural factors that promote the spread of Boko Haram in the affected area are common ethnicity of the people, common language that is Hausa, Fulfulde, and Kanuri spoken by majority of the people. It also revealed that the people's common cultural beliefs and religious beliefs have promoted the spread of the sects as they identify themselves with the sect members regarding religion and cultural ways of life represented in dressing and common traditional marriage practices. These findings show that the spread of the Boko Haram sect among the affected area within the four countries is as a result of the local communities who share the common language, religion, cultural beliefs, and practices.

Secondly, findings have revealed that there was a weak cooperation between the member states at the beginning of the crises, but gradually, the necessity to fight Boko Haram has caused cooperation ties to grow stronger. The findings further revealed that there is a strong military cooperation between the affected countries but individual, and community cooperation is still shaking due to lack of trust.

Thirdly, findings revealed that the borders of the affected Lake Chad Basin countries are porous and ungoverned which has facilitated the movement of people, refugees and militarized refugees from other conflict areas to be recruited by the Boko Haram sect. The findings also revealed that through the ungoverned porous borders trade in illegal goods such as weapons and firearms takes place as there is free uncontrolled movement of people from one area to another. Still, the findings revealed that with the spread of the Boko Haram, there has been an increase in the number of military checks point in the affected area though difficult with vast borders.

Fourthly, the findings revealed that high level of illiteracy and poverty has contributed to the spread of Boko Haram. This is due to high illiteracy rate of parents, youth and children in the affected area who are easily manipulated by the sect members to join them. Also, the findings revealed that there is a prevalence of street children in the area, and the children are easily recruited into the sect for little wages. The findings further revealed little infrastructural

development in the affected communities which has made the people accept the humanitarian message of Boko Haram that they are fighting to improve the living conditions of the local people.

5.2 Conclusion

The Boko Haram terrorist group has grown into the world's fiercest terrorist organization and has spread to Nigeria's neighboring countries. The transnational activities of the Boko Haram sect have been favored by socio-cultural drivers such as common traditional practices, marriage, ancestral bond with traditional beliefs, language, and manner of dressing of the people. These factors have made it easy for Boko Haram members to identify easily with community members.

The weak cooperation between the Lake Chad Basin countries in the fight against Boko Haram at the beginning contributed to the spread of the insurgency in the entire affected area, though an improvement in state cooperation has brought about a combine Multilateral Joint Tasks Force, which is gaining ground in the fight against the terrorist group.

Furthermore, the porous borders are closer to the area termed the "arc of instability" which stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean with militarized refugees living from one conflict to another fighting for little or no pay. Also, arms are acquired easily and smuggled from conflict areas such as Libya, Somalia, Mali and Sudan without control.

Finally, the human capital deficits have contributed to the spread of the Boko Haram sect through recruitment of unemployed and uneducated youths and children who provide their services to the sect for little or no pay. Again, poverty has promoted the spread of the Boko Haram sect in the affected countries as community members do not see any benefits denouncing sect members whom they identify themselves with to the central political regimes which seem to have forgotten about the local communities. With all these, the transnational activities of the Boko Haram sect would continue if the governments of the affected countries do not improve on military cooperation and intelligence. Basic services should be provided to the local communities and also dialogue should be used to understand the demands of the Boko Haram sect. All in all the study has shown that Boko Haram is neither a completely national nor a completely transnational terror group. Rather, the group should be classified somewhere in between these two extremes. It does not only operate in Nigeria, and it does not only operate outside Nigeria. In a nutshell, Boko Haram is a terrorist group with a metaphoric lifestyle or history.

5.3 Recommendations

To improve socio-cultural ties and destroy the network set-up by Boko Haram due to socio-cultural affinity the following should be done:

- The authorities of Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, and Niger should set up social centers in the affected areas that would promote socio-cultural interaction of the local people with people from other areas of the country.
- Also, educated Muslims from other areas should be used as models to enlighten the local communities on the message of Islam in the Quran that Islam does not promote violence or war, but it is a peaceful religion.
- Moreover, the government should set up policies that include and involve all parts of its national territory. Neglecting some areas in the country will only give room for the inhabitants to identify with the culture, belief and way of life of another neighboring country.

To foster state cooperation, military cooperation, and community cooperation;

- The Lake Chad Basin countries affected by the Boko Haram insurgency should build new intelligence gathering infrastructure or a new intelligence fusion center to coordinate, improve and integrate intelligence gathering and sharing. They need to obtain more timely and action intelligence from local sources in the areas affected by Boko Haram in their respective countries. They can also establish an office of the Special Anti-Terrorism Coordinator for the affected countries. This would help strengthen their cooperation not only militarily but also on intelligentsia.
- Still, local authorities and community members should be educated and included in the fight against Boko Haram by listening to the local people rather than treating them as subjects. This would improve on the fight against the terrorist organization.

To improve security across the vast porous ungoverned and insecure borders;

- A tight seal should be instituted across all border crossings with Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria. This will limit the sect's access to training, funds, men and arms from AQIM and collaborators in the countries as mentioned earlier. This will isolate the sect and make it difficult for it to operate.

- The government can also set up or establish military camps or military training centers along the borders. This would help tighten security along those borders and as a result, it will be safe for civilian settlement.

To improve on human capital deficits that foster the spread of Boko Haram in the area;

- Instituting a sort of Marshall Plan for northeast Nigeria and northern Cameroon aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the local population. With the objective of providing quality education, building local capacity and providing jobs.
- Creating a Ministry of Northern Affairs just like the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs to help address the various difficulties in the north, including the dilemmas of poverty, unemployment, ignorance and radical Islam. This establishment would be one way of gaining the hearts and minds of the locals and reducing local grievances on which Boko Haram feeds.
- Still, infrastructural development with provision of social facilities should be carried out by governments of the affected countries such that the people would feel belonged and closer to their central political governments.
- The approach of peaceful negotiations to resolve the conflict with reconciliation and dialogues should be placed at the forefront such that victims of Boko Haram fight should not regroup and form another sect because of grievances.

5.4 Suggested areas for further research

- Research could also be carried out on the root causes of Boko Haram with focus on how the conflict has spread and the national factors contributing to the group's emergence and persistence, such as local mismanagement, unemployment, and poverty.
- Another study could focus on the immaterial aspects of transnationalism, such as ideological inspiration and imitation. Comparing Boko Haram's teachings with the ideologies of other militant Islamist groups in the region is one interesting avenue for further research.
- Finally, another study could focus on the link between Boko Haram and other Islamist Jihadist groups for example AQIM and Ansaru, Such that the mode and transnational activities of the various groups would be compared internationally, and international solutions proposed to check terrorism.

REFERENCES

A. BOOKS

- Aberbach, Joel D. and Bert A. Rockman. (2002), *Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews, PS: Political Science and Politics*.
- Agnew, John (1994). “*The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory*”, Review of International Political Economy.
- Alexander Wendt. (1994), “*Collective Identity Formation and the International State*” American Political Science Review, p. 389, 1994.
- Andres, Amado Philip. (2008), “*West Africa under Attack: Drugs, Organized Crime and Terrorism as the Threats to Global Security*”, UNISCI.
- Attoh S. (1996), ‘*Geography of sub-Saharan Africa*’. Practice Hall Engineering; Simon and Schuster Company, 1996.
- Ayeotan DD, “*Terrorism: The Boko Haram Phenomenon in Nigeria*”, unpublished Thesis, 2012.
- Berry, Jeffrey M, (2002), “*Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing*”, PS: Political Science and Politics.
- Minteh B, Ashlie Perry. (2013), *Terrorism in West Africa - Boko Haram’s Evolution, Strategy and Affiliations*, Palmer House Hotel; Chicago Illinois.
- Bøås, Morten, (2012), *Violent Islamic uprising in northern Nigeria: from the Taleban to Boko Haram II*, NOREF.
- Bryman, Allan, (2004), *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Burk J. (2002), “*Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations*”. Armed Forces & Society.
- Campbell, John (2010). “*Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink. Lanham*”, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010.
- Campbell, John (2013). *Boko Haram and Ansaru in Northern Nigeria, Africa in Transition*.
- Checkel, Jeffery T, (2010), *Transnational Dynamics of Civil War, Simons Papers in Security and Development*. School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University; Vancouver.
- Collier, Paul, (2007), *The Bottom Billion. Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cook, David, (2012), “*Boko Haram Escalates Attacks on Christians in Northern Nigeria*”. CTC Sentinel.

Coser L, (2003), “*sociologist who focused on intellectuals*”. New York Times" NY edition.

Dokken, Karin, (2008), *African Security Politics Redefined*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ibeanu and F. Mohammed (eds.) *Oiling the Violence: The Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Niger Delta*. Abuja: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2006.

Egwu S. 2001 “*State and Class in Nigeria: context for Framing Middle Belt Identity.*” In *The Right to be Different: perspectives on Minority Rights, the Cultural Middle Belt and Constitutionalism in Nigeria*, edited by Nankin Bagudu and Dakas C.J. Dakas. Jos: League for Human Rights (LHR).

Englebert P, “*State Legitimacy and Development in Africa*”, African Studies Center: Boston University, 2000.

Enwerem M I, 1995, *A Dangerous Awakening: The Politicization of Religion in Nigeria*. African Studies Program: University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Freedman L, (2004). “*The Concept of Security*”, in Mary Hawksworth and Maurice Kogan (Eds) *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*. Vol.2 2nd edition. London: Routledge.

Fukuyama F, (2004), “*State-building: Governance and World-Order in the 21st Century*”. New York: Cornell University Press.

George, Alexander L. and Bennett A, (2005), “*Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*”. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gerring, J, (2007), “*Case Study research. Principles and practices*”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Global Terrorism Database, (2012), “*New data reveals al-Qaida-linked groups among most active terrorist groups in the world*”, START Consortium 2011 data from Global Terrorism Database.

Gordon, Raymond G., Jr. (ed.), “*Ethnologue: Languages of the World*,” Fifteenth edition. Dallas, Tex.: SIL International, 2012.

International Monetary Fund (October, 2012). “*World Economic Outlook Database*,” 2012.

Robert J and Sørensen G, (2003), *Introduction to International Relations*. Theories and Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kiras, J D, (2007), *Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency*”, in John Baylis, James J. Lapid, Yosef, (2001), “*Rethinking the ‘International’: IBO Clues for Post-Westphalian Mazes*”, in Albert Mathias (ed.): *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Lewis, Peter M. and Michael Bratton, (2000). “*Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria*,”.

Lipset, S. M. (1963), *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Mike E, 2004, Contemporary Multi – Religious and Peaceful Coexistence of Islam in Nigeria's State, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC).

Nance M.W, (2014), Terrorist Recognition Handbook, "A practitioner's manual for predicting and indentifying terrorist activities" 3rd edition, CRC Press.

Obasi N, (2002), *Small Arms Proliferation and Disarmament in West Africa: Progress and Prospects of the ECOWAS Moratorium*. Abuja: Apophyl Productions.

Olojo A, 2013, *Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram*. ICCT Research Paper, October.

Osaghae, E and Suberu, T., 2013, *A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria*, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), Working Paper No. 6. January, 2005. As of February 1.

Osita A, 2004, *Ethnic Militias and the Threat to Democracy in Post-Transition Nigeria*, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Research Report No. 127.

Paden, J., 2007, Comments at the Symposium on *Religious Conflict Religious Conflict in Nigeria: Contemporary Religious Dynamics in Nigeria - Session 2*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Pauline O. (2015), *Religions in Global politics: Has Boko Haram developed into a terrorist group as a result of their fanatical religious stands or is it a product of a broader socio-economic context?* University of Sussex.

Pérouse de Montclos M. A, *Boko Haram: Regional Issues around the Uprising*. Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House: London, 2015.

Peter M. Lewis. *Growing Apart: Oil, Politics and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2007.

Pham J.P, (2012). "African Security Brief: Boko Haram's Evolving Threat". African Center for strategic Studies.

Risse-Kappen T, (ed.) *Bringing Transnational Relations back in. Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rotberg R I. (2003), (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Ruby, R, and Shah S T, *Nigeria's Presidential Election: The Christian-Muslim Divide*. Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2007.

Sambanis N, (2008), *Terrorism and Civil War*”, in Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza (eds.) *Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Suberu, Rotimi T. (2001), *“Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria”*. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press.

Sumner, Andrew and Michael T, (2008), *“International Development Studies: Theories and Methods in Research and Practice”*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Tansey O, (2007), *Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling*”, PS: Political Science and Politics.

Tawil C, (2015), *The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb*”: Expansion in the Sahel and Challenges from within Jihadist Circles. Report by the Jamestown Foundation. Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation.

Thomas A and Tim A, (2000) *“Agencies of Development”*, in Alan Thomas and Tim Allen (eds.) *Poverty and Development in the 21st Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Witting, Timothy, (2011), *Understanding Terrorist Finance*”. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

B. PUBLISHED ARTICLES

Amnesty International, (2012), *Nigeria: Trapped in a cycle of violence*. Report by Amnesty International, London: Amnesty International Ltd.

Asuni, Judith Burdin, (2009), *Blood Oil in the Niger Delta*”, United States Institute for Peace (USIP).

Christopher L, (1995), *The Social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation*, UNRISD Discussion Paper No. 59.

Cook, David, (2013), *Boko Haram: Reversals and Retrenchment*”, CTC Sentinel.

Cook, David, (2011), *The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria*,” CTC Sentinel.

Eveslage, Benjamin. (2012), *Is Boko Haram the new al Qaeda? Not so fast*.

Falola, Toyin, (2011), *The History of Nigeria*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing.

Flynn, Donna, (1997), *We are the border’: identity, exchange, and the state along the Bénin-Nigeria border*, American Ethnologist.

Gomez, Miguel J D C, (2010), *A Financial Profile of the Terrorism of Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates*”, Perspectives on Terrorism.

Hazen, J M, (2007), “Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective”, an Occasional Paper of the Small Arms Survey. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

Hegghammer, T, (2010), “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad”, International Security.

Lohrmann R, (2000), “Migrants, Refugees and Insecurity. Current Threats to Peace?” International Migration.

Mehaan P and Speier J, (2011), “Boko Haram - Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland”. United States House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence.

Onuoha, Freedom C. (2011), “Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation and Human Security in Nigeria”, Conflict Trends.

Onuoha, Freedom C. (2010), “The 9/7 Boko Haram Attack on Bauchi Prison: A Case of Intelligence Failure”, Peace & Conflict Monitor Special Report.

Stenersen, Anne, (2008), “The Internet: A virtual Training Camp?”, Terrorism and Political Violence.

Stewart, Scott (2012), “Nigeria's Boko Haram Militants Remain a Regional Threat”, Security Weekly, Stratford Global Intelligence.

Stewart, Scott, (2012), “Terrorism Tradecraft”. Stratford Global Intelligence.

Watts, Clint, Jacob Shapiro and Vahid Brown, (2007), “Al-Qaeda’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa”. A Counter Terrorism Centre (CTC) Report.

Zenn, Jacob, (2013), “A Brief Look at Ansaru’s Khalid al-Barnawi - AQIM’s Bridge Into Northern Nigeria”, Militant Leadership Monitor.

Zenn, Jacob, (2012), “Boko Haram’s Dangerous Expansion into Northwest Nigeria,” CTC Sentinel.

Zenn, Jacob, (2013), “Boko Haram’s International Connections”, CTC Sentinel.

Zenn, Jacob, (2013), “Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali Intervention”, CTC Sentinel.

C) REPORTS

Human Rights Watch, (2011). “Nigeria: New Wave of Violence Leaves 200 Dead”.

Human Rights Watch, (2012). “*Spiraling Violence. Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria*”. Report by Human Rights Watch.

Ibeanu, O, (2000). “*Oiling the Friction: Environmental Conflict Management in the Niger Delta*”, Environmental Change and Security Project Report.

IRIN, NIGERIA-CHAD: Migrants fleeing Boko Haram violence await aid”, Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), March 6, 2012.

Jacoby L.E, (2004). Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States” United States of America Defense Intelligence Agency.

Last, Murray, (2011). Nigeria’s Boko Haram, Muslim Institute Blogs.

Philippe B L, (2001). *The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts*”, Political Geography.

Messner, J. J. (ed.), (2012). *The Fund for Peace Failed States Index 2012*. Annual Report from The Fund for Peace.

Militant Leadership Monitor, (2012). *Abu Usmatul Al-Ansari Announce Breakaway Faction*”, Brief, Terrorism Monitor.

Militant Leadership Monitor, (2012). *Boko Haram: A Militant Leadership Monitor Special Report. Personalities behind the Insurgency*, Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation.

National Bureau of Statistics (2012). “Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010”.

Oftedal, E, (2013). Boko Haram: An Overview. A Norwegian Defence Research Establishment Report.

Ola Awoniyi, (2012). “*Nigeria defence chief says Boko Haram has ties to Al-Qaeda*”.

Report to the UN Security Council (2011). “*Report of the assessment mission on the impact of the Libyan crisis on the Sahel region*”.

UNHCR (2012). “*Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees*”. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

UNHCR (January 2012). “*Statistical Snapshot*”. Data compiled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Walker, Andrew (2012). “*Special Report: What is Boko Haram?*” United States Institute of Peace Special Report.

D) PUBLISHED JOURNALS

Herbst, Jeffrey and Greg Mills. “Africa and the war on terror”, The RUSI Journal, 2003.

Pitcher, Anne, Mary H. Moran and Michael Johnston, “Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa”, African Studies Review, 2009.

Seignobos, (2015), “Boko Haram emir praises al Qaeda”, The Long War Journal.

Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law (TTSRL) “The Evolving Threat of Transnational Terrorism in Policymaking and Media Discourse”, The European research project on Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law (TTSRL), 2008.

Udeh C, (2011). “Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorist Financing in West Africa: Challenges and Strategies”, African Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 69-88.

E) NEWSPAPERS

CNN (June 18, 2012). “Boko Haram claims responsibility for Nigeria church bombings”.

France 24, ”North Cameroon living in shadow of Boko Haram”. March 2, 2013.

Iluyemi, Victor, “Nigeria sees joint border patrol with Niger as significant to fight Boko Haram”, World Stage News, October 21, 2012.

Wikileaks (February 5, 2010). “Cable 10YAOUNDE83, Cameroonian President Biya Gives Ambassador”.

Daily Trust, “Nigeria: Boko Haram Trained in Mali - Army Chief”, by Ismail Mudashir, Maryam Ahmadu-Suka and Victor Edozie, January 18, 2013.

Goodspeed, Peter, “Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists targeting Christians, turning Nigeria into cauldron of religious strife”, National Post 2012.

Mail and Guardian (August 31, 2011). “Mamman Nur masterminded UN attack, says Nigeria”, by Camillus Eboh.

Onabanjo, Dipo, “How Illegal Arms Threaten Nigeria’s Unity”, Tell Magazine 2012.

Premium Times (May 13, 2012). “Boko Haram gets N40 million donation from Algeria”.

Reuters (December 24, 2011). “In Nigeria’s North, Deadly Clashes With an Islamist Group”.

Reuters (January 20, 2013). “Islamists Ansaru claim attack on Mali-bound Nigeria troops – paper”.

Soniyi, Tobi, “Nigeria: Terrorism - Court Resumes Ndume's Trial”, This Day news paper of July 4, 2012.

This Day (October 22, 2012) “Boko Haram Suspect Was Arrested in Ex-Governor’s House”.

This Day (September 29, 2012). “Army Arrests Immigration Officer, Others over Boko Haram Links”.

This Day (September 9, 2012). “Nigeria: Boko Haram - How Recovered Arms Are Left in Armouries”.

Vanguard (January 19, 2013). Boko Haram leader Shekau shot, escapes to Mali”.

Vanguard (2012). “Boko Haram issues three-day ultimatum to Christians”.

Vanguard (November 24, 2011). “Al-Qaeda assist us and we assist them – Boko Haram spokesman”.

F) WEBSITES

<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iAic5DvBdtHOMxy96ZPzTKvcAXjQ?docId=CNG.d5514f749a7ad3759a659047be4df987.681>

<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g1HSCZCkSQ8eU0k6BBd2pC4ZNylg?docId=CNG.72ca66ee1a4afc263528e0bb35442cac.5f1>

<http://www.almuntadatrust.org/response-to-observer/>

<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/realism-vs-liberalism-in-the-development-of-counterterrorism-strategy>

<http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/18/world/africa/nigeria-church-bombings>

<http://www.leglobaliste.com/2012/10/03/is-nigerias-boko-haram-a-transnational-threat/>

<http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800>

<http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95014/NIGERIA-CHAD-Migrants-fleeing-Boko-Haram-violence-await-aid>

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/26/world/africa/video-claims-french-familys-kidnappers-are-nigerian-extremists.html?_r=0

<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/11/al-qaeda-assist-us-and-we-assist-them-boko-haram-spokesman/>

<http://www.everyculture.com/Africa-Middle-East/Kanuri-History-and-Cultural-Relations.html#ixzz3rxmwHuBo>



**PAN AFRICAN INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT – WEST
AFRICA (PAID-WA), BUEA**

INTERVIEW GUIDE

I am **FORMBUI ZINA ANTIMBOM**, a final year Masters student from the Department of Development Studies, specializing in Peace, Conflict Studies and International Relations at the Pan African Institute for Development – West Africa (PAID-WA) Buea. As part of the requirements for the completion of my programme, I am carrying out a research on the topic: **Transnationalization of Terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin: The Case of Boko Haram**.

Your responses will be anonymous and will not be linked to you personally. Mind you of the fact that, any information provided will be treated with tact and confidentiality.

Demographic data

Name: (not compulsory)

Gender: Male () Female ()

Age: 10-20 () 21-30 () 31-40 () 41-50 () 51+ ()

Marital Status: Single () Married () Divorced () Separated () Widow/er ()

Level of education: Primary () Secondary () University () Other ()

Occupation:

Longevity of service: 3-12 months () 1-5years () 6-9years () 10≥ ()

a) Cultural affinity between the Kanuris contributed to the transnational activities of Boko Haram?

1) In your opinion what are the cultural aspects that influence the spread of the Boko Haram activities in the Lake Chad basin?

a) Language

b) Belief

c) Manner of dressing

d) Others (please specify):

2) To what extent do these factors influence the spread of Boko Haram activities in the Lake Chad basin?(> 50 = greater extent, < 50 = lesser extent, 0 = none).

a) Language; lesser extent () greater extent () none ()

b) Belief; lesser extent (), greater extent () none ()

c) Manner of dressing; lesser extent (), greater extent (), none ()

b) Cooperation between Nigeria and Cameroon to fight Boko Haram's transnational activities

1. What is the level of cooperation between the four affected countries of Boko Haram's attack?

- a) Military cooperation
- b) State cooperation
- c) Community cooperation
- d) Personal cooperation
- e) Others (please specify)

2. To what extent is the cooperation between the four affected countries a contributing factor to Boko Haram's transnational activities?

- a) Weak
- b) Very weak
- c) Strong
- d) Very strong
- e) Neutral

4. What measures can you propose to strengthen cooperation ties between the four affected countries?

.....
.....

5. What possible recommendations can you propose to help fight against the Boko Haram terrorists activities?

.....

c) The relationship between ungoverned borders and Boko Haram activities

1a) Have long and uncontrolled borders linking the four affected countries contributed to the spread of conflict in the region?

1 b) what is the Border situation between Nigeria and Cameroon?.....

.....

1 d) what kind of goods are transported through the borders? (You can tick more than one)

- a) Arms and light weapons ()
- b) Drugs ()
- c) Bombs ()
- d) Food ()

3. Have these goods facilitated the spread of Boko Haram conflict in the region and how and to what extent?

4. What kind of activities do you think are carried out in these uncontrolled borders?

- a) Kidnapping
- b) Transportation of illegal goods
- c) Killing
- d) Raping

have these activity led to the spread of Boko Haram?

d) Level of ignorance and deprivation contributing to the spread of conflict in the region?

1. Have the following factors led to the spread of Boko Haram”

- a) high illiteracy rate in the locality
- b) poor educational infrastructures
- c) high rate of street children (Almajiris)
- d) poverty

2) What is the level of education in the north as compared to other regions in the country?.....

THANKS FOR YOUR COOPERATION